Using a trusted execution environment for a proof-of-work key wrapping scheme that verifies remote device capabilities

ABSTRACT

The technology disclosed herein provides a proof-of-work key wrapping system for verifying device capabilities. An example method may include: accessing instructions, a wrapped key, and a cryptographic attribute for the wrapped key from an encrypted memory region, wherein the wrapped key encodes a cryptographic key; executing, by a processing device, the instructions to derive the cryptographic key in view of the wrapped key and the cryptographic attribute, wherein the executing consumes computing resources for a duration of time; using the cryptographic key to access program data; executing, by the processing device, the program data, wherein the executed program data evaluates a condition related to the duration of time; and transmitting a message comprising an indication of the evaluated condition.

TECHNICAL FIELD

The present disclosure generally relates to a cryptographic system forverifying computing resources of a computing device, and is morespecifically related to a proof-of-work key wrapping mechanism thatencrypts a cryptographic key and verifies the ability of the computingdevice to derive the cryptographic key.

BACKGROUND

Computers often use cryptographic techniques to restrict access tocontent. The cryptographic techniques may involve generating a secretkey that is used by a device to access the content. The secret key maybe something as simple as a passcode or something more complex, such asa cryptographic token. The device may use the secret key as input to alocking mechanism to gain access to the content. The locking mechanismmay involve a cryptographic function and the device may use the secretkey as input when executing the cryptographic function. If the secretkey is correct, the cryptographic function will enable access to thecontent and if the secret key is incorrect, the cryptographic functionwill not enable access to the content. In a simple example, the secretkey may be used with the cryptographic function to encrypt content andmay be subsequently used to decrypt the content to enable a device toaccess the content. The secret key may be transmitted between computingdevices and before transmission the secret key may be encrypted to avoidthe secret key from being compromised during transmission. The processof encrypting the secret key may be referred to as key wrapping and theresulting encrypted secret key may be referred to as a wrapped key.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

The present disclosure is illustrated by way of examples, and not by wayof limitation, and may be more fully understood with references to thefollowing detailed description when considered in connection with thefigures, in which:

FIG. 1 depicts a high-level block diagram of an example computingenvironment that uses a proof-of-work key wrapping system, in accordancewith one or more aspects of the present disclosure;

FIG. 2 depicts a block diagram of an example computing device with oneor more components and modules for configuring a proof-of-work keywrapping task, in accordance with one or more aspects of the presentdisclosure;

FIG. 3 depicts a block diagram of an example computing device with oneor more components and modules to perform a proof-of-work key wrappingtask to derive a key from a wrapped key, in accordance with one or moreaspects of the present disclosure;

FIG. 4 depicts another example computing environment that may use aproof-of-work key wrapping task to verify characteristics of a computingdevice, in accordance with one or more aspects of the presentdisclosure;

FIG. 5 depicts a block diagram of a proof-of-work key wrapping systemthat replaces the access key, wrapping key, and/or wrapped key with aset of corresponding keys, in accordance with one or more aspects of thepresent disclosure;

FIG. 6A depicts a block diagram of a key deriving process for derivingindependent keys in parallel, in accordance with one or more aspects ofthe present disclosure;

FIG. 6B depicts a block diagram of a key deriving process for derivingintegrated keys serially, in accordance with one or more aspects of thepresent disclosure;

FIG. 7 depicts a flow diagram of an example method for executing aproof-of-work key wrapping system to cryptographically verify computingresources of a computing device, in accordance with one or more aspectsof the present disclosure;

FIG. 8 depicts a block diagram of an example computer system inaccordance with one or more aspects of the present disclosure;

FIG. 9 depicts a flow diagram of another example method for executing aproof-of-work key wrapping system to cryptographically verify computingresources of a computing device, in accordance with one or more aspectsof the present disclosure;

FIG. 10 depicts a block diagram of an illustrative computing deviceoperating in accordance with the examples of the present disclosure.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

Many computing environments are configured to provide on-demandavailability of computing resources to consumers without directmanagement by the consumers. This configuration may be referred to ascloud computing because the computing resources may be hosted by anentity and made available to multiple consumers over the internet, whichis often represented as a cloud. The entity that consumes the computingresources may be different from the entity hosting the computingresources. The hosting entity may provide the computing resources usinga pool of collocated or distributed computing devices (e.g., data centeror distributed system), one or more individual computing devices (e.g.,edge servers or desktops), or a combination thereof. The consumingentity may provide input data (e.g., code or configurations) that enablethe computing resources of the hosting entity to execute computing taskson behalf of the consuming entity. The hosting entity may indicateattributes of the computing resources that are available for consumptionor have been consumed by the computing tasks and may or may not receivecompensation from the consuming entity.

The computing environments that host the computing resources are oftenvery complex and the consuming entity may want the ability to verifythat the computing resources are capable of meeting the expectations ofthe consuming entity before the computing task is executed. Verifyingthe availability or capacity of the computing resources may be importantbecause the compensation may be based on the computing resources orthere may be a minimum amount of computing resources needed tosuccessfully execute the computing task. The computing resources mayfail to satisfy the expectations of the consuming entity for a varietyof reasons. For example, the computing resources may have be incorrectlyadvertised, over utilized, improperly configured, maliciouslycompromised, other reason, or a combination thereof.

Aspects of the present disclosure address the above and otherdeficiencies by providing technology that integrates a cryptographic keywrapping system with a proof-of-work system to verify computingresources of a recipient computing device. The proof-of-work system mayfunction as a computational puzzle that may be solved by the recipientcomputing device. In one example, the technology may generate acryptographic key and may encrypt the cryptographic key to produce awrapped key. The wrapped key may be provided to a recipient computingdevice without an unwrapping key and the content of the cryptographickey may remain hidden until the recipient computing device can derivethe cryptographic key in view of the wrapped key.

The manner in which the cryptographic key is wrapped (e.g., strength ofencryption) and any hints for breaching the wrapped key may be selectedso that the process of deriving the cryptographic key from the wrappedkey functions as a proof-of-work task (e.g., a computational puzzle).The proof-of-work task can be configured so that it will consume aparticular amount of computing resources (e.g., processor cycles,input/output (I/O) operations). The result of the proof-of-work task maybe the original cryptographic key or an unwrap key that can be used toexpose the original cryptographic key.

The wrapping of the cryptographic key and the hints for deriving thecryptographic key (e.g., breaching the wrapped key) may be based on oneor more cryptographic attributes. The cryptographic attributes may beselected to cause the recipient computing device to consume a quantityof a particular computing resource (e.g., processor, memory, disk,network) or take a particular amount of time to derive the cryptographickey from the wrapped key (e.g., complete the proof-of-work task). Thecryptographic attributes may be selected by the device wrapping thecryptographic key or by another device that provides the cryptographicattributes to the device wrapping the cryptographic key (e.g., taskscheduler or management device). The cryptographic attributes may beselected based on the computing resources of a recipient computingdevice. The actual recipient computing device may be unknown at the timeof wrapping the key and the selection may be based on an approximationof computing resources of intended recipient computing devices. Thecryptographic attributes may correspond to attributes for generatingaccess keys, wrapping keys, candidate keys, other operation, or acombination thereof. In one example, the cryptographic attributes maycorrespond to one or more key lengths, cryptographic functions, saltvalues, other attribute, or a combination thereof.

The technology discussed herein may verify the capabilities of arecipient computing device by using a proof-of-work key wrapping schemethat targets particular characteristics of the recipient computingdevice. The recipient computing device may be the computing device thatwill host the code or configuration of a consuming entity. Thecharacteristics may relate to any computing resource of the recipientcomputing device and may include one or more aspects of processingdevices (e.g., operations per second), memory devices (e.g., memoryspace or IO), storage devices (e.g., read/write speed or storageavailability), network devices (e.g., bandwidth), other devices, or acombination thereof. The selection of the cryptographic attributes maycause the process of breaching the wrapped key to consume a particularquantity of computing resources. By further incorporating a timedetermination feature, the technology may determine how long thebreaching takes and therefore calculate a rate of the computingresources (e.g., rate=quantity/time). The rate of the computingresources may be used to quantify the performance of the computingresources and may be compared to one or more predetermined thresholdvalues to detect whether the recipient computing device satisfies athreshold (e.g., threshold value). The threshold may be based on a valueadvertised by a provider of computing resources or a value requested bya consumer of the computing resources. The proof-of-work wrapping may beused to verify the capabilities of any computing device hosting the codeor configuration of the consumer and the computing device being verifiedmay correspond to a cloud computing device (e.g., host machine, virtualmachine, container), a distributed computing device (e.g., edgecomputing node), an end user device (e.g., smart phone, laptop),internet of things device (e.g., smart speaker), other computing device,or a combination thereof.

The technology discussed herein may execute the proof of work taskwithin a trusted execution environment (TEE) of the recipient computingdevice to reduce the ability of the recipient computing device toexploit the verification mechanism. There are many ways that theverification mechanism can be exploited (e.g., compromised, undermined,avoided, gamed, cheated, hacked, etc.). In one example, the recipientcomputing device may inspect incoming data to determine that it is aproof of work task and assign or reallocate computing resources toensure that the proof of work task is done more quickly than othertasks. In another example, the recipient computing device may inspectthe data of the proof of work task and compare it to past tests toreduce the complexity and solve the proof of work task more quickly. Inthese and other examples, the trusted execution environment (TEE) mayreduce the exploitability because the TEE may be provided by a securityenhanced processor that increases the confidentiality and integrity ofdata of a process or machine from other processes executing on the sameprocessor. The processor may increase confidentiality of the data byassociating the process with an encrypted memory region (e.g., enclave)and by encrypting the data for the process and not for any otherprocesses.

The systems and methods described herein include technology provide manyadvantages. In particular, an of the proof-of-work key wrapping systemis that the settings for the proof-of-work (e.g., cryptographicattributes) may be selected to be specific to a class of recipientcomputing devices but may be independent from the content beingprotected or the particular bit sequence of the cryptographic key.Therefore, the settings for the proof-of-work can be selected before thecontent or cryptographic key is chosen, created, or modified. Forexample, in an encryption scenario the proof-of-work settings forwrapping a cryptographic key may be selected before, during, or after,the cryptographic key is generated or the content is encrypted. Inaddition, approximating the computing resources that will be consumeddoes not depend on the size, complexity, or location of the content thatis being protected.

Another advantage of the proof-of-work key wrapping system may be toavoid relying on a third party service to verify whether theproof-of-work was successfully completed. Some proof-of-work systems mayrely on other devices (e.g., trusted third parties) that are separatefrom the computer that is solving the proof of work puzzle. Theseparation may be used to help ensure that the data for checking theresults is not exploited to make solving the computational puzzleeasier. Requiring a separate device for checking the results may makethe system more complex and/or vulnerable. The technology disclosedherein, in one example, may avoid the need for a separate checkingdevice by enabling the verification to be self-authenticating. Forexample, when the results of the proof-of-work are incorrect theresulting key will not work and access will be prohibited.

Various aspects of the above referenced methods and systems aredescribed in details herein below by way of examples, rather than by wayof limitation. The examples provided below discuss a computingenvironment where recipient computing devices (e.g., host machines) havetheir computing resources verified via a proof-of-work key wrappingmechanism and the proof-of-work task may be configured before, during,or after the recipient computing devices or content are identified.

FIG. 1 illustrates an exemplary computing environment 100 in whichimplementations of the disclosure may operate. Computing environment 100may include one or more computing devices at a single physical location(e.g., data center) or across multiple physical locations (e.g.,different data centers). In one example, computing environment 100 mayinclude content 102A-Z, a cryptographic key 104, one or more computingdevices 110A-Z, and a network 150.

Content 102A-Z may be any intangible or tangible content that acomputing device or user can be restricted from accessing using thetechnology disclosed herein. Intangible content may be digital contentsuch as program data that cannot be touched by a human and may includedata in one or more messages (e.g., packets, data frames, analog ordigital signals), data storage objects (e.g., computer files, databaserecords, arrays), other digital or analog resources, or a combinationthereof. Tangible content may include resources that can be touched by ahuman and may include computer hardware, physical credentials (e.g., IDbadges, licenses), paper documents, currency, other physical objects, ora combination thereof.

Cryptographic keys 104 and 106 may be any pieces of information that canbe used to protect or enable a computing device to access a portion ofcontent 102A-Z. Cryptographic keys 104, 106 may exist in a humanreadable form (e.g., passcode, password), a non-human readable form(e.g., digital token or digital certificate), other form, or acombination thereof. Cryptographic keys 104, 106 may be input to acryptographic function, output of a cryptographic function, or acombination thereof. As shown in FIG. 1, cryptographic key 104 may be anaccess key that enables a computing device or user to access content andcryptographic key 106 may be used as a key for wrapping or unwrappingcryptographic key 104 to produce wrapped key 114. Cryptographic keys104, 106 may be or include one or more encryption keys, wrap keys,decryption keys, session keys, transport keys, migration keys,authentication keys, authorization keys, digital certificates, integritykeys, verification keys, digital tokens, license keys, signatures,hashes, other data or data structure, or a combination thereof.

Cryptographic keys 104, 106 and any number of other cryptographic keysmay be used as part of a cryptographic system that provides privacy,integrity, authentication, authorization, non-repudiation, otherfeatures, or a combination thereof. Computing environment 100 may use acombination of multiple different cryptographic systems to implement theproof-of-work key wrapping. For example, one or more of the computingdevices 110A-Z may use an asymmetric cryptographic system to perform anexchange of cryptographic key 104, cryptographic key 106, wrapped key114, cryptographic attributes 116, other data, or a combination thereof. The exchanged data may then be used to enable one or more of therecipient computing devices 110B-Z to derive cryptographic key 104 fromwrapped key 114 in order to access or provide access to content 102A-Z.Example cryptographic systems are discussed in more detail in regards toencrypting component 115 of FIG. 2.

Computing devices 110A-Z may include one or more server devices (e.g.,standalone servers or rack mounted servers), personal computers (e.g.,desktops, workstations, laptops), mobile devices (e.g., phones, tablets,watches, key fobs, key cards), embedded systems (e.g., automationdevices), other electrical or electromechanical device, or a combinationthereof. Computing devices 110A-Z may be able to create, transmit,receive, or use one or more cryptographic keys to protect or accesscontent. Computing device 110A may wrap cryptographic key 104 andcomputing devices 110B-D may unwrap and subsequently use cryptographickey 104 to access content. Each of the computing devices 110A-Z mayinclude respective computing resources 111A-Z.

Computing resources 111A-Z may include one or more physical computingresources, virtual computing resources, or a combination thereof thatcan be used to perform a computing task. The computing task may be theproof-of-work task or another task that has been assigned. The othertasks may be the same or similar to a job, workload, service, function,operation, other task, or a combination thereof. Computing resources111A-Z may include hardware resources, program resources, otherresources, or a combination thereof. The hardware resources may includeprocessor resources (e.g., processor speed, process architecture, numberof CPU/GPU cores), storage resources (e.g., disk space, memory size),input/output (I/O) (e.g., networking I/O, processor I/O, memory I/O),other resources, or a combination thereof. The program resources maycorrespond to features of an application, operating system, hypervisor,kernel, other computing program, or a combination thereof. Computingresources 111A-Z may be determined (e.g., approximated, estimated,predicted) by computing device 110A and stored as characteristic data,which is discussed in more detail in regards to FIG. 2.

Computing device 110A may function as a device for managing the keywrapping and may select the settings used to configure the proof-of-workkey wrapping. Computing device 110A may also or alternatively functionas a scheduler of the tasks. In the example shown in FIG. 1, computingdevice 110A may select the cryptographic attributes and also wrapcryptographic key 104 in view of the selected cryptographic attributes.In other examples, computing device 110A may select cryptographicattributes 116 but one or more other devices may create thecryptographic key, wrap the cryptographic key, or a combination thereof.As shown in FIG. 1, computing device 110A may include a cryptographicattribute component 113, an encrypting component 115, and a dataproviding component 117. Cryptographic attribute component 113 mayestimate the characteristics of a recipient computing device (e.g., oneof computing devices 110B-D) and select at least one cryptographicattribute based on the characteristic of the recipient computing device.Encrypting component 115 may access the selected cryptographicattributes and wrap the cryptographic key 104 based on the selectedcryptographic attribute. Data providing component 117 may provide thewrapped key 114 and details about one or more of the selectedcryptographic attributes 116 to one of the computing devices 110B-Z(e.g., recipient computing devices).

Computing devices 110B-Z may function as host machines that can executetasks provided by computing device 110A. Computing devices 110B-Z mayhave their computing resources verified using the tasks associated withthe proof-of-work key wrapping (e.g., key breaching task), which mayinvolve deriving cryptographic key 104 from wrapped key 114 withoutbeing provided the unwrapping key. In one example, computing devices110B-Z may be referred to as recipient computing devices because theymay be the recipient of a wrapped version of cryptographic key 104(e.g., wrapped key 114) and a cryptographic attribute 116 (e.g.,breaching hint). In another example, computing devices 110B-Z and may bereferred to as host computing devices because they may host one or morecomputing tasks of a consumer. In yet another example, computing devices110B-Z may also or alternatively be referred to as accessing devicesbecause after deriving cryptographic key 104 from wrapped key 114 theymay use cryptographic key 104 to access content 102A-Z (e.g., programdata, task inputs). In any of these example, computing device 110B-Z mayprovide trusted execution environments 101A-C to execute the tasks(e.g., verification task and/or consumer task).

Trusted execution environments 101A-C may be secure areas within therespective computing devices and may guard data of a computing processfrom being accessed by other computing processes. The process may be aset of one or more computing processes, threads, or instruction streamsand in one example it may be a set with a single process (e.g., userprocess) and in another example it may be a set of multiple processes(e.g., all processes of a particular virtual machine). The trustedexecution environment may be provided by one or more processors coupledto a storage device (e.g., memory). The processor may guard data of theset of processes from being accessed by other processes that may be moreor less privileged. For example, in a trusted execution environment acentral processing processor (CPU) may guard data of a lower privilegedprocess (e.g., user process or virtual machine process) from beingaccessed by a higher privileged process (e.g., kernel process orhypervisor process). The data being guarded may include executable data(e.g., code), non-executable data (e.g., input data or output data),other data, or a combination thereof. In some examples, trustedexecution environments 101A-C may be provided by special instructionsand features of the processor and may be the same or similar to SoftwareGuard eXtensions (SGX)® provided by Intel®, Memory Encryption Technologyprovided by AMD® (e.g., Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV)®, SecureMemory Encryption (SME, SME-ES), TrustZone® provided by ARM®, othertechnology, or a combination thereof. In some or all of these examples,the processor may guard the data by establishing one or more encryptedmemory regions 103A-C.

Each of the trusted execution environments 101A-C may include one ormore trusted execution environment instances (e.g., TEE instances). Aninstance of the trusted execution environment may be established for aparticular set of one or more processes and may be associated with aparticular memory encrypted region. The instances of a trusted executionenvironment may be provided by the same hardware (e.g., processor andmemory) but each instance may be associated with a different memoryencrypted region and a different set of one or more processes (e.g., setincluding an individual process or set of all VM processes). As shown inFIG. 1, trusted execution environments 103A-C may be provided by arespective processors that may guard data associated with a particularinstance using one or more encrypted memory regions 103A-C.

Encrypted memory regions 103A-C may be regions of memory that areassigned to a set of one or more processes and that store data in anencrypted form. The data may be encrypted and decrypted by hardwaredevices using cryptographic keys that are accessible to the hardwaredevices and may be inaccessible to processes executed by the hardwaredevices, this may be the same or similar to hardware based encryption,hardware level encryption, other term, or a combination thereof. Thehardware devices may include one or more general purpose processors(e.g., CPUs), graphical processing units (GPUs), secure elements (SE),secure cryptoprocessors, memory controller, other integrated circuit, ora combination thereof.

The encrypted memory region may be a contiguous or non-contiguousportion of physical memory, virtual memory, logical memory, or otherabstraction and may a portion of primary memory (e.g., main memory),auxiliary memory (e.g., solid state storage), adapter memory, otherpersistent or non-persistent storage, or a combination thereof. In oneexample, the encrypted memory region may be a portion of main memoryassociated with a particular process and the processor may encrypt thedata when storing the data in the memory region and may decrypt the datawhen accessing the data in the memory region. The data in the memoryregion may be transformed (e.g., encrypted or decrypted) before, during,or after it is stored in or accessed from the memory region. The datamay remain in an encrypted form while in the encrypted memory region andmay or may not remain in an encrypted form when stored within theprocessor.

The encryption and decryption that occurs in regards to the encryptedmemory region and the associated trusted execution environment may beseparate from the proof of work key wrapping scheme. For example, theproof of work key wrapping scheme may be performed in the absence of thetrusted execution environment but that may enable the recipientcomputing device to access data of the proof of work task to exploit thetask. As discussed herein, the data of the proof of work task may bestored in the encrypted memory region and may be executed using thetrusted execution environment. The data of the proof of work task mayinclude the instructions (e.g., executable code, derivation program),the input data (e.g., wrapped key, breaching hints), output data (e.g.,unwrap key, cryptographic key), other data, or a combination thereof.The results of the proof of work task may enable the respectivecomputing devices 110B-Z to derive the cryptographic key 104 from thewrapped key 114 and to use the derived cryptographic key to accesscontent.

The content being accessed by computing devices 110B-Z may be stored inthe encrypted memory region 103, other local data storage (e.g.,integrated or directly attached storage), remote storage (e.g.,accessible over a network), other storage, or a combination thereof. Forexample, computing device 110C may use the unwrapped cryptographic key104 to access content 102C that is stored locally, content 102Z oncomputing device 110Z, or content 102C stored remotely on data store120. For example, computing device 110B may access content by using theunwrapped cryptographic key 104 to establish a communication channel 122with a device that contains the content (e.g., data of document orprogram). Communication channel 122 may be initiated or established bycomputing device 110B, data store 120, another computing device, or acombination thereof. Communication channel 122 may involve one or moreconnections 124 that communicably couple computing device 110B with oneor more other devices (e.g., data store 120 or computing device 110Z).Connection 124 may include one or more wired connections, wirelessconnections, or a combination thereof. Communication channel 122 may beassociated with cryptographic key 104 and cryptographic key 104 may havebeen used to establish communication channel and/or to enhance one ormore security features of a communication channel. The security featuresmay enhance privacy, integrity, authentication, authorization,non-repudiation, other feature, or a combination thereof. Communicationchannel 122 may be a security enhanced connection that occurs at one ormore levels of a networking stack and may be the same or similar to aconnection based on a Transport Layer Security (TLS), Internet ProtocolSecurity (IPSec), Virtual Private Network (VPN), Hyper Text TransferProtocol Secure (HTTPS), other connection technology or protocol, or acombination thereof.

Communication channel 122 may be a network connection, acomputer-to-computer connection, other connection, or a combinationthereof. The network connection may be an indirect connection thattraverses one or more network nodes (e.g., access points, switches,routers, or other networking infrastructure device) that communicablycouple computing device 110A with one or more of computing devices110B-Z. A computer-to-computer connection may be the same or similar toa peer-to-peer connection and may be a direct connection betweencomputing device 110B and data store 120 or one of the computing device110C-D (e.g., bluetooth connection, ad-hoc network connection). In oneexample, cryptographic key 104 may be a session key that is used todecrypt and/or encrypt data of content 102D. Content 102D may includedata this is stored in an encrypted or non-encrypted form when on aremote device (e.g., data store 120) and may be transmitted overcommunication channel 122 in an encrypted form (e.g., doubly encryptedform). Computing device 110B may then receive the encrypted content anddecrypt it using cryptographic key 104.

Computing device 110C may include or be coupled to a data storage devicethat stores content 102C. Content 102C may include one or more encrypteddata storage objects, which may include file objects (e.g., encryptedfiles), database objects (e.g., databases, records, field values), otherstorage objects, or a combination thereof. Computing device 110C mayprovide computing device 110B with access to content 102C bytransmitting data of content 102C (e.g., encrypted content) over anencrypted or non-encrypted communication channel. Computing device 110Bmay receive the data and decrypt the data using cryptographic key 104.

Network 150 may be a public network (e.g., the internet), a privatenetwork (e.g., a local area network (LAN) or wide area network (WAN)),or a combination thereof. In one example, network 150 may include awired or a wireless infrastructure, which may be provided by one or morewireless communications systems, such as a wireless fidelity (WiFi)hotspot connected with the network 150 and/or a wireless carrier systemthat can be implemented using various data processing equipment,communication towers, etc.

FIGS. 2 and 3 are block diagrams illustrating a more detailed example ofcomputing devices 110A and computing device 110B respectively, inaccordance with one or more aspects of the present disclosure. FIG. 2includes an exemplary computing device 110A that may function as a taskscheduler and may include modules for configuring a proof-of-work keywrapping scheme. FIG. 3 includes an exemplary computing device 110B thatmay host tasks assigned by the task scheduler and may include modulesthat use a trusted execution environment to breach the wrapped key inview of the proof-of-work key wrapping scheme.

In regards to FIG. 2, the components, modules, or features discussed inregards to computing devices 110A may be consolidated to a singlecomputing device (e.g., a device that selects settings and wraps thekey) or may be spread across multiple computing devices (e.g., onedevice selects settings and one or more other devices create and wrapthe key). In the example shown, computing device 110A may include acryptographic attribute component 113, an encrypting component 115, anda data providing component 117, which may be the same or different asthose illustrated in FIG. 1.

Cryptographic attribute component 113 may enable computing device 110Ato identify and select cryptographic attributes that cause aproof-of-work task (e.g., breaching the wrapped key) to consume aparticular quantity of computing resources. In one example,cryptographic attribute component 113 may include a characteristicdetermination module 210, a consumption determination module 212, and anattribute selection module 214.

Characteristic determination module 210 may enable computing device 110Ato determine characteristics of another computing device that willexecute the proof-of-work task (e.g., breaching the wrapped key). Thecomputing device executing the proof-of-work task may be referred to asa recipient computing device, a host computing device, an intendedcomputing device, a target computing device, other term, or acombination thereof. In one example, the recipient computing device maybe unknown when selecting the cryptographic attributes. In anotherexample, the recipient computing device may be known and may or may notbe contacted to determine the characteristics. In either example,characteristic determination module 210 may determine thecharacteristics using one or more operations that approximate, estimate,predict, or extrapolate the characteristics of an intended recipientcomputing device. The operations may be based on current data (e.g.,devices accessing content), historical data (e.g., past devicesaccessing content), advertising data (e.g., advertised resourcespecifications), contractual data (e.g., service agreements), devicemodeling data (e.g., average resources of a smart phone, laptop,workstation, server, supercomputer), user input, data extrapolated fromscientific projections of future resource availability, other data, or acombination thereof. The determined characteristics of a recipientcomputing device may be stored in data storage 240 as characteristicdata 242.

Characteristic data 242 may include values that correspond to one ormore computing resources of a recipient computing device. As discussedabove, the computing resources of a recipient computing device mayinclude hardware resources, program resources, other resources, or acombination thereof and characteristic data 242 may describe, indicate,or represent these resources. The values of characteristic data 242 mayinclude one or more measurements, numbers, characters, strings, labels,or other value that correspond to a time, quantity, and/or rate of oneor more of the computing resource. For example, characteristic data mayinclude or indicate on or more processor speeds (e.g., 8.4 GHz),processor types (e.g., CPU, GPU, FPGA, ASIC), processor architecture(×86, powerPC®, Sparc®, ARM®), number of processors (e.g., 1, 2, 16),number of cores (e.g., dual core, quad core), disk space, memory size,memory I/O, processor I/O, networking I/O, program version (e.g., kernelversion, kernel module, application feature), graphics acceleration,encoding/decoding acceleration, encryption/decryption acceleration,other resource details, or a combination thereof.

Consumption determination module 212 may enable computing device 110A todetermine the quantity of computing resources that the proof-of-worktask should consume in order to accomplish an intended goal (e.g.,resource verification or temporal delay). Consumption determinationmodule 212 may perform one or more calculations on input values todetermine one or more output values. The input values and/or outputvalues may include one or more mathematical functions or numeric valuesrelated to time, quantity, rate, other metric, or a combination thereof.Consumption determination module 212 may use the input and/or outputs asvariables in one or more equations, formulas, models, otherrepresentation, or a combination thereof. In one example, consumptiondetermination module 212 may solve a set of one or more equations todetermine one or more output values. For example, the inputs may includea duration of time T (e.g., number of seconds) and a rate R (e.g.,operations per second) and consumption determination module 212 may usea variation of the equation Rate (R)=Quality (Q)/Time (T) to determine aparticular quantity. The particular quantity may correspond to theamount of computing resources (e.g., total number of operations) thatshould be consumed to accomplish the intended goal.

The intended goal may vary depending on the use case for theproof-of-work key wrapping and may be to impose a delay, to verifycomputing characteristics, other goal, or a combination thereof. In oneexample, the intended goal may be to delay the recipient computingdevice from accessing content and consumption determination module 212may receive data indicating an intended time duration (e.g., user inputdesignating a two day delay). Consumption determination module 212 mayderive a rate of a recipient computing device from characteristic data242 (e.g., operations per second of processor) and use the intended timeduration and rate to determine a quantity. The quantity may correspondto the amount of the computing resource that the proof-of-work taskshould consume in order to delay the recipient computing device for thecorresponding time duration.

In another example, the intended goal may be to test characteristics ofthe recipient computing device. Consumption determination module 212 mayreceive input indicating an intended rate of the computing resource(e.g., advertised processor rate or memory capacity of a virtualmachine). Consumption determination module 212 may use the input rateand derive a quantity of the computing resource that the proof-of-worktask should consume. The derived quantity may be a function of time asopposed to a particular time duration and one or more time durations maybe selected as a threshold, which is discussed in more detail below. Oneor more of the input values or output values may be stored as intendedconsumption data 244 in data storage 240 and used by attribute selectionmodule 214.

Attribute selection module 214 may enable computing device 110A toselect the cryptographic attributes that control the quantity ofcomputing resources consumed by a recipient computing device to derivethe cryptographic key from the wrapped key. Attribute selection module214 may execute two different roles when configuring the proof-of-workkey wrapping and the roles may be performed together or separately. Thefirst role is for selecting cryptographic attributes to use to createand encrypt (e.g., wrap) the cryptographic key. The second role is toselect cryptographic attributes to provide to the recipient computingdevice to derive (e.g., unwrap) the cryptographic key.

The cryptographic attributes selected for wrapping the cryptographic keymay be the same or different from the cryptographic attributes providedto the recipient computing device for unwrapping the cryptographic key.In one example, there may be a set of cryptographic attributes selectedto wrap the cryptographic key and one or more cryptographic attributesfrom the set may be provided to the recipient computing device to unwrapthe wrapped key. In another example, one or more of the cryptographicattributes provided for unwrapping the key (e.g., cryptographicattributes 116) may be absent from the set of cryptographic attributesfor wrapping the cryptographic key. In either example, the cryptographicattributes may affect the quantity of computing resources consumed to bythe recipient computing device.

The cryptographic attributes may be included in sets that each includeone or more cryptographic attributes. A cryptographic attribute mayrelate to or indicate a feature of a cryptographic function,cryptographic input, cryptographic output, other data, or a combinationthereof. The cryptographic function may be a Key Derivation Function(KDF) discussed below and may access cryptographic input and generatecryptographic output. The cryptographic input may include a seed value,salt value, output size (e.g., bit length), other data, or a combinationthereof. Some or all of the cryptographic input may be provided to thecryptographic function as separate parameters, combined parameters, or acombination thereof. A cryptographic attribute may indicate a feature ofa key (e.g., seed length) or may be data for deriving the key (e.g.,seed, nonce, key fragment, key share). Examples of cryptographicattributes may indicate the size of an access key (e.g., 512 bit accesskey), size of the wrapping/unwrapping key (e.g., 128 bit unwrappingkey), size of input to derive the key (e.g., salt value), other data, ora combination thereof. The set of cryptographic attributes 116 may bethe same or similar to cryptographic constraints, limitations,restrictions, controls, settings, configurations, parameters, inputs,outputs, indicators, suggestions, hints, clues, other term, or acombination thereof.

Attribute selection module 214 may select the set of cryptographicattributes based on the characteristics of the recipient computingdevice by analyzing the characteristic data 242, intended consumptiondata 244, other data, or a combination thereof. In one example, theselection of the cryptographic attributes is intended to cause therecipient computing device to consume a predetermined quantity ofcomputing resources. In another example, the selection of thecryptographic attributes is intended to cause the recipient computingdevice to consume a predetermined quantity of time. In either example,attribute selection module 214 may access characteristic data 242 thatindicates characteristics of computing resources of the recipientcomputing device. Attribute selection module 214 may then access theintended consumption data 244 that indicates the intended quantity ofthe computing resources that should be consumed to breach a wrapped key.

Attribute selection module 214 may then calculate and select one or moresets of cryptographic attributes 116 in view of characteristic data 242,intended consumption data 244, other data, or a combination thereof. Forexample, a first cryptographic attribute may correspond to a key lengththat has multiple length options (e.g., 32 bit, 64 bit, 128 bit, 256bit, 512 bit, 1024 Bit). The larger the key length the more computingresources would typically be consumed to identify the correct key. Asecond cryptographic attribute may correspond to a cryptographicfunction that has multiple options (key derivation functions A, B, andC). Attribute selection module 214 may then determine the quantity ofcomputing resources consumed for one or more candidate combinations andselect a candidate combination (e.g., 64 bit, key derivation function B)that satisfies the quantity indicated by the intended consumption data244. Satisfaction of the quantity may be the candidate combination thatis closest, closest without going under, closest without going over,other variation, or a combination thereof.

Encrypting component 115 may enable computing device 110A to encryptdata and the data may include content data, key data, or a combinationthereof. Encrypting component 115 may use one or more keys to performthe encryption and a first key may be used to encrypt the content and asecond key may be used to encrypt the first key (e.g., wrap the firstkey). The features of encrypting component 115 may be executed by thesame computing device that selects the cryptographic attributes or maybe executed by one or more different computing devices. In the exampleshown, encrypting component 115 may include a wrap key creation module220, key obtaining module 222, a key encrypting module 224, and contentencrypting module 226.

Wrap key creation module 220 may enable computing device 110A to createcryptographic key 106 for wrapping one or more other keys. Cryptographickey 106 may be used to encrypt a key and may be referred to as a wrapkey, a wrapping key, an encryption key, or other term. Wrap key creationmodule 220 may create the wrap key in view of one or more of theselected cryptographic attributes 116, which may identify acryptographic key function and one or more parameter values to use asinput. The cryptographic key function may or may not incorporate anumber generator (e.g., random or pseudo-random number generator) andthe parameter values may include length data (e.g., 64 bit lengthindicator), salt data (e.g., salt values), nonce data (e.g., noncevalues), seed data (e.g., seed values), key data (e.g., key fragment,key share), other data, or a combination thereof.

The cryptographic key function may be the same or similar to a keygenerator function (e.g., keygen), a key derivation function (KDF),other cryptographic function, or a combination thereof. In one example,a key generator function may create the wrap key based on a key lengthvalue (e.g., 128 bit) and a salt value that are derived from theselected cryptographic attributes. In another example, a key generatorfunction may be a key derivation function that derives the wrap key inview of cryptographic key material (e.g., base key, seed value, saltvalue, nonce value) and may cause the resulting wrap key to be relatedto the cryptographic key material (e.g., mathematically related keys).The key derivation function may involve key strengthening (e.g., keyhardening), key stretching (e.g., key lengthening), other keymodification, or a combination thereof. The key derivation function mayor may not enhance the security of the key or adjust the length of thekey to comply with a particular format (e.g., minimum key length). Infurther examples, cryptographic key function may be a Password-Based KeyDerivation Function (e.g., PBKDF1, PBKEDF2) that repeatedly applies aHash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC) and one or more saltvalues to cryptographic input to produce a cryptographic key. In any ofthe above examples, the resulting wrap key may be stored in data storage240 as cryptographic key 106.

Key obtaining module 222 may enable computing device 110A to obtain thecryptographic key used to access the content (e.g., cryptographic key104) so that it can be wrapped using cryptographic key 106. In oneexample, key obtaining module 222 may obtain cryptographic key 104 bycreating it in a manner that is the same or similar to the processdiscussed above in regards to cryptographic key 106. The creation ofcryptographic key 104 may or may not be based on one or more of theselected cryptographic attributes 116 and may use the same or differentcryptographic key functions (e.g., two different key derivationfunctions). In another example, key obtaining module 222 may obtaincryptographic key 104 from a remote source or a local source. The remotesource may be a remote computing device that is accessible over anetwork. The remote computing device may be another computing device(e.g., certificate authority, domain controller) that associated with auser, company, or service associated with computing device 110. Thelocal source may be local to computing device 110A and may be in closeproximity to computing device 110A (e.g., NFC, RFID, Bluetooth),directly attached to computing device 110A (e.g., USB Smart Card),integrated within computing device 110A (e.g., hardware embedded key).In either example, cryptographic key 104 may be subsequently stored indata storage 240.

Key encrypting module 224 and content encrypting module 226 may enablecomputing device 110A to encrypt different types of data. Key encryptingmodule 224 may include features for encrypting one or more cryptographickeys (e.g., key encryption) and content encrypting module 226 mayinclude features for encrypting content that the recipient computingdevice intends to access using the wrapped key (e.g., contentencryption). The process of encrypting a cryptographic key may bereferred to as key wrapping, key encapsulation, or other term and mayinvolve encoding cryptographic key material of key into a wrapped keythat masks or hides the cryptographic key material from the recipient ofthe wrapped key until it is decrypted (e.g., unwrapped, unencapsulated).

Module 224 and 226 may use the same or different cryptographic systems.For example, key encrypting module 224 may use a weaker cryptographicsystem (e.g., smaller key length) to enable wrapped keys to be breachedand content encrypting module 226 may use a stronger cryptographicsystem (e.g., larger key length) to increase the cost of access to thecontent in the absence of the access key. The cryptographic systems maybe the same or similar to a symmetric key cryptographic system, anasymmetric key cryptographic system, other cryptographic system, or acombination thereof.

A symmetric key cryptographic system may use the same cryptographic keysfor encryption of plaintext and for decryption of ciphertext. Thecryptographic keys used in a symmetric key cryptographic system may bereferred to as symmetric keys and may be identical keys (e.g., copies ofthe same key) or there may be a simple transformation to go between keysof a symmetric key pair. The symmetric key cryptographic system mayinvolve stream ciphers, block ciphers, other cipher, or a combinationthereof. The stream ciphers may encrypt individual elements (e.g.,digits, characters) of a message one at a time. Block ciphers may take aset of elements and encrypt them as a single unit and may or may not padthe resulting plaintext so that it is a multiple of a block size of nbits (e.g., 64 bit, 128 bit, 256 bit, 1024 bit). In one example, thesymmetric key cryptographic system may use one or more key wrapconstructions that wrap or encapsulate cryptographic key material. Theconstructions may be built from standard primitives such as blockciphers and cryptographic hash functions. In other examples, thesymmetric key cryptographic system may be the same or similar toAdvanced Encryption Standard (AES), Galois/Counter Mode (GCM), TripleData Encryption Standard (3DES, TDES), International Data EncryptionAlgorithm (IDEA), Blowfish, Lattice-based cryptography, multivariatecryptography (e.g., rainbow scheme), super singular elliptic curvecryptography, super singular isogeny graphs cryptography, othercryptographic system, or a combination thereof.

An asymmetric key cryptographic system may use different keys forencryption and decryption. A first key may be used to encrypt plaintextinto ciphertext and a second key may be used to decrypt the ciphertextinto plaintext. The first and second keys may be referred to as anasymmetric pair and may be different keys that may or may not bemathematically related. In one example, the asymmetric key cryptographicsystem may be a public key cryptographic system and the first key may bea public key and the second key may be a private key. The public key maybe published and accessible to multiple computing devices and theprivate key may remain secret and accessible to one or more computingdevice associated with a particular entity (e.g., user). A public keycryptographic system may enable any device to encrypt data using thepublic key of a recipient computing device. The encrypted data may bedecrypted with the recipient's private key. An advantage of asymmetrickey cryptographic system is that it may avoid the need of a securechannel for an initial exchange of one or more cryptographic keysbetween the parties, which is often a challenge for symmetriccryptographic systems.

Data providing component 117 may enable computing device 110A to providedata for the proof-of-work key wrapping system to the recipientcomputing device to enable the recipient computing device to accessprotected content (e.g., confidential data, program data). The databeing provided may be in the form of one or more data structures and mayinclude one or more wrapped keys, cryptographic attributes, encryptedcontent, other data, or a combination there of Computing device 110A mayprovide the data to one or more recipient computing devices and the oneor more recipient computing devices may be able to individually orcollectively access the protected content as discussed in more detail inregards to FIG. 4-7. Computing device 110A may provide the data to therecipient computing device by either transmitting the data to therecipient computing device, by storing the data on a storage device thatcan be accessed by the recipient computing device, or by instructing oneor more other devices to create, move, copy, or transmit data to therecipient computing device.

The data may be provided via one or more data structures that aretransmitted over one or more transmission mediums. The transmissionmediums may include one or more network connections, peer-to-peerconnections, shared storage devices (e.g., USB drive, smart card),electronic mail, physical mail, other data transmission mechanism, or acombination thereof. The data structures may include one or more filesystem objects (e.g., file, directory, metadata), database objects(e.g., record, table, tuple), computer messages (e.g., network messages,email messages, text messages, instant messages, inter-process messages,interrupts, signals, other messages, or a combination thereof.

In the example shown in FIG. 2, data providing component 117 may includea wrapped key module 230, an attribute module 232, and a content module234. Wrapped key module 230 may enable computing device 110A to provideone or more wrapped keys to recipient computing devices. In one example,a cryptographic key may be encoded as a single wrapped key and thesingle wrapped key may be provided to one or more recipient computingdevices. In another example, a cryptographic key may be encoded inmultiple wrapped keys and a portion of the cryptographic key may beincluded in each wrapped key (e.g., wrapped key fragment). In eitherexample, wrapped key module 230 may provide the wrapped key 114 to atleast one recipient computing device without providing a key to decryptthe wrapped key (e.g., no unwrapping key).

Attribute module 232 may include features that enable computing device110A to provide one or more cryptographic attributes to enable therecipient computing device to derive a key from the wrapped key. The oneor more cryptographic attributes provided to the recipient computingdevice may function as hints or clues that reduce the computationalcomplexity of deriving cryptographic key 104 from the wrapped key 114.As discussed above, the cryptographic attributes provided to therecipient computing device may be from the set of selected cryptographicattributes used to wrap the key or may be a cryptographic attribute thatis absent from the set. In either example, the one or more cryptographicattributes 116 provided to the recipient computing device may be basedon or derived from the wrapped cryptographic key, a wrap key, an unwrapkey, other data, a previously selected cryptographic key, or acombination thereof.

The cryptographic attribute may be provided to the recipient computingdevice with the wrapped key or provided separate from the wrapped key.In one example, providing the cryptographic attribute with the wrappedkey may involve packaging them together in one or more data structuresand providing them using one of the data transmission mediums (e.g.,package 602 of FIG. 6). In another example, providing the cryptographicattribute separate from the wrapped key may involve storing them inseparate data structures and sending them separately via the sametransmission medium or different transmission mediums. In a furtherexample, one or more of the cryptographic attributes (e.g., hints) maybe embedded in the proof-of-work key wrapping protocol or the programimplementing the protocol that is executing on the recipient computingdevice.

Content module 234 may enable computing device 110A to provide content102 to recipient computing devices. Content 102 may be encrypted datathat can be decrypted after the wrapped key 114 is unwrapped. Asdiscussed above, content 102 may be provided with the wrapped key 114,cryptographic attribute 116, other data, or a combination thereof.Enabling the recipient computing device to derive cryptographic key 104and access content 102 is discussed in more detail in regards to FIG. 3.

FIG. 3 is block diagram illustrating a more detailed example of acomputing device 110B that may host a task assigned by the taskscheduler and may include modules that use a trusted executionenvironment to perform the proof-of-work tasks configured by computingdevice 110A of FIG. 2. The components, modules, and features discussedin regards to computing devices 110B may be consolidated to a singlecomputing device (e.g., a single device that derives the key and uses itto access content) or may be spread across multiple computing devices(e.g., multiple device derive respective keys that are combined toenable access to the content).

Computing device 110B may receive data provided by one or more computingdevices and may use the data to derive a cryptographic key to accesscontent. The received data may include one or more wrapped keys 114,cryptographic attributes 116, content 102, other data, or a combinationthereof. Computing device 110B may receive the data from the same source(e.g., computing device 110A) or from multiple different sources (e.g.,computing device 110A and one or more local or remote data stores 120).Computing device 110B may store and process the data using a trustedexecution environment 101, a key deriving component 310, and a contentaccessing component 320.

Trusted execution environment 101 may be the same or similar to thetrusted execution environments 101A-C discussed in regards to FIG. 1. Inthe example shown in FIG. 3, computing device 110B may execute thefeatures of key deriving component 310 within the trusted executionenvironment 101 and the features of content accessing component 320 maybe executed by computing device 110B without using a trusted executionenvironment. In other examples, portions of both the key derivingcomponent 310 and the content accessing component 320 may be executedwithin a trusted execution environment (e.g., both in the same trustedexecution environment instance or in different trusted executionenvironments instances). In either example, trusted executionenvironment 101 may execute key deriving component 310 and may store inencrypted memory region 103 the instructions, input data, intermediatedata, and/or output data of key deriving component 310. The instructionsmay be executable data or program data that get resolved to hardwareinstruction calls for executing the key derivation process. The inputdata may be the wrapped key 114, the verification data 344, one or morecryptographic attributes (e.g., breaching hints), other data, or acombination thereof. The intermediate data may be the candidate key data342 (e.g., potential unwrapping keys) and the output data may includethe derived cryptographic key output by key deriving component 310.

Key deriving component 310 may enable computing device 110B to deriveone or more access keys from one or more wrapped keys 114. In oneexample, deriving the access key from wrapped key 114 may involvederiving an unwrap key that can be used to decrypt the wrapped key 114and expose the access key. In another example, deriving the access keyfrom wrapped key 114 may involve deriving the access key from wrappedkey 114 without identifying the unwrap key. In general, thecryptographic attributes discussed above may be selected so thatderiving the unwrap key for the wrapped key is less computationallyintensive than deriving the access key from the wrapped key in theabsence of the unwrap key (e.g., easier to guess the unwrap key then toguess the key that is wrapped). In the example of FIG. 3, key derivingcomponent 310 may include a wrapped key receiving module 312, anattribute analysis module 314, a candidate generation module 316, and averification module 318.

Wrapped key receiving module 312 may include features for receiving oneor more wrapped keys 114. As discussed above, wrapped key 114 may beincluded in a data structure that is received over a transmissionmedium. In one example, wrapped key receiving module 312 may receivewrapped key 114 over a network connection. In another example, wrappedkey receiving module 312 may receive the key from a local or remotesource that stores the wrapped key and the content that will be accessedusing the unwrapped key. In either example, wrapped key 114 may bereceived with one or more cryptographic attributes 116 that are packagedwith the wrapped key or received separate from cryptographic attributes(e.g., different sources, transmission mediums, or data structures). Inresponse to receiving wrapped key 114, wrapped key receiving module 312may store wrapped key 114 and the one or more cryptographic attributes116 in data storage 340.

Attribute analysis module 314 may analyze cryptographic attributes thatare associated with wrapped key 114. In the above example, at least oneof the cryptographic attributes may be received from another computingdevice as discussed above. In another example, one or more cryptographicattributes may be embedded in the proof-of-work key wrapping protocol ora program implementing the client side of the proof-of-work key wrappingprotocol (e.g., protocol always uses a specific key length or keyderivation function).

Attribute analysis module 314 may analyze the cryptographic attributes(e.g., hints) to facilitate deriving the cryptographic key from wrappedkey 114. Facilitating the derivation may involve reducing thecomputational complexity of deriving the access key from wrapped key114. In one example, the cryptographic attributes may facilitate thederivation by reducing the amount of computing resources consumed by abrute force attack to discover an unwrap key that successfully decryptsthe wrapped key 114. Example cryptographic attributes may include anindication of a cryptographic key function (e.g., key derivationfunction), a key size (e.g., unwrap key length, access key length),cryptographic key material (e.g., salt value, nonce value, seed value),other data, or a combination thereof.

Candidate generation module 316 may enable computing device 110B togenerate candidate key material that can be used to derive thecryptographic key from wrapped key 114. The candidate key material maybe a candidate key, a portion of a candidate key (e.g., key fragment),data for generating a candidate key, other data, or a combinationthereof. The data may be input for one or more cryptographic keyfunctions (e.g., key derivation functions) that generate the candidatekey as discussed above. In one example, candidate generation module 316may generate a set of candidate keys and store the set as candidate keydata 342.

Verification module 318 may analyze the candidate key data 342 to verifywhether any of the candidate keys are correct. Verifying whether acandidate key is correct may involve executing a verification functionusing verification data 344. Verification data 344 may include averification code (e.g., tag), program data (e.g., executable code toperform verification), configuration data (e.g., settings), other data,or a combination thereof. Verification data 344 may be included in theproof-of-work key wrapping client and/or provided with or included inwrapped key 114, cryptographic attribute 116, or content 102, or acombination thereof.

Verification module 318 may compare verification data 344 to other datato determine whether the candidate key is correct. The verification datamay be a verification code that is the same or similar to anauthentication tag, a message authentication code (MAC), other bitsequence, or a combination thereof. In one example, the verificationcode may be encrypted with the cryptographic key and therefore may beembedded in wrapped key 114. Verification module 318 may decrypt wrappedkey 114 using the candidate key and compare the decrypted verificationcode to an expected value to determine whether the candidate keycorrectly decrypted wrapped key 114. In another example, theverification code may be encrypted with the content and therefore may beembedded in content 102. Verification module 318 may unwrap the wrappedkey using the candidate key and then use the unwrapped key to decryptthe verification code and content 102. The verification code may becompared to an expected value to determine if the candidate key iscorrect. In either example, the verification process may also oralternatively involve Authenticated Encryption (AE), AuthenticatedEncryption with Associated Data (AEAD),Encrypt-then-Authenticate-Then-Translate (EAX), Encrypt-then-MAC (EtM),Encrypt-and-MAC (E&M), MAC-then-Encrypt (MtE), Key Wrap, Cipher BlockChaining MAC (CBC-MAC), Counter with CBC-MAC (CCM), EAX, otherverification process, or a combination thereof.

Verification module 318 may analyze one or more candidate keyssequentially or in parallel until a candidate key that satisfies thevalidation process is identified. Verification module 318 may then usethe identified candidate key (e.g., unwrap key) to derive cryptographickey 104 (e.g., the access key) from wrapped key 114 and storecryptographic key 104 in data storage 340. Cryptographic key 104 may beany cryptographic key material or bit sequence that enables computingdevice 110B to access protected content. In one example, cryptographickey 104 may be a decryption key, an authentication key, an authorizationkey, a signature key, a transport key, an integrity key, other key, or acombination thereof.

Content accessing component 320 may enable computing device 110B to usecryptographic key 104 after it is unwrapped to enable access to accesscontrolled content (e.g., encrypted program data). The process ofenabling access may then involve decrypting the content, establishing aconnection to access the content, authenticating a user or device, othermechanism, or a combination thereof. Enabling access may involveproviding the unwrapped version of cryptographic key 104 as input to acryptographic function. The cryptographic function may be the same orsimilar to the cryptographic function discussed above and may includeone or more encryption/decryption functions, authentication functions,authorization functions, verification functions, integrity functions,non-repudiation functions, hash functions, other functions, or acombination thereof.

The cryptographic function may be executed on computing device 110B, onone or more other computing devices, or a combination thereof. In oneexample, computing device 110B may execute the cryptographic functionlocally using cryptographic key 104A. In another example, thecryptographic function may be executed by another computing device usingcryptographic key 104. In either example, content accessing component320 may perform or cause one or more operations to provide, establish,facilitate, allow, permit, arrange, or enable access to content 102.This may cause content 102 to be available to computing device 110B orto a user of computing device 110. In the example shown in FIG. 3,content accessing component 320 may include an initiation module 322,decryption module 324, a connection module 326, and an authenticationmodule 328.

Initiation module 322 may enable computing device 110B to process arequest to access the content. The request may be manually orautomatically initiated based on input from a user, scheduler,management device, load balancer, other input, or a combination thereof.In one example, the proof-of-work key wrapping task may be manually orautomatically initiated in response to receiving a scheduled task.

Decryption module 324 may enable computing device 110B to decryptcontent 102 using cryptographic key 104. Cryptographic key 104 may be asymmetric key for encrypting and decrypting data of content 102. Thedata may include encrypted message data, encrypted file data, encrypteddatabase data, other data, or a combination thereof. The symmetric keyused by the computing device 110B may be wrapped before, during, orafter content 102 is encrypted and may or may not be identical to thesymmetric key used to encrypt the content.

Connection module 326 may enable computing device 110B to establish acommunication channel using cryptographic key 104. The communicationchannel may be the same or similar to the communication channel 122 ofFIG. 1 and may enable communication with another device (e.g., datastore or computing device). Establishing the communication channel mayinvolve using the cryptographic key 104 to authenticate the computingdevice by authenticating or authorizing a user, process, device,interface, address, port, socket, other computing structure, or acombination thereof. Establishing the communication channel may also oralternatively involve using the cryptographic key to verify messagecontent received over the communication channel. In one example,cryptographic key 104 may include a session key and the processingdevice may use the session key to establish a communication channel(e.g., TLS or IPSec connection) for accessing the content.

Authentication module 328 may enable computing device 110B to usecryptographic key 104 to authenticate with one or more other computingdevices. Cryptographic key 104 may function as a token or signature andauthentication module 328 may initiate an authentication process and mayprovide the cryptographic key 104 with a request or response message.

Encrypted memory region 103 may include primary storage (e.g., volatileor non-volatile memory), secondary storage (e.g., hard drive, solidstate drive), network storage (e.g., network attached storage (NAS),storage area network (SAN), cloud storage), other data storage, or acombination thereof.

FIG. 4 is a block diagram illustrating a computing environment 400 thatmay use a proof-of-work key wrapping system discussed above to verifycomputing characteristics of a computing device that will host consumercode or configurations. The technology may be used to ensure thatcomputing resources of a host computing device are capable of providinga threshold level of performance. This may be accomplished byconfiguring the proof-of-work key wrapping system with cryptographicattributes that target characteristics of the computing resources of ahost computing device (e.g., recipient computing device). As discussedabove, the selection of the cryptographic attributes may cause theprocess of breaching the wrapped key to consume a particular quantity ofcomputing resources. By further incorporating a time determinationfeature the technology can determine how long the breach takes andtherefore calculate a rate of the computing resources (e.g., rate(R)=quantity (Q)/time (T)).

The rate of the computing resources may be used to quantify theperformance of the computing resources and may be compared to one ormore threshold values (e.g., predetermined threshold values) to detectwhether the recipient computing device satisfies the threshold value.The threshold value may be based on a value advertised by a provider ofcomputing resources or a minimum rate requested by a consumer of thecomputing resource. For example, the threshold value may be a valuecorresponding to speed, capacity, bandwidth, other performance metric,or a combination thereof (e.g., processor speed, memory size, andnetwork bandwidth). The threshold value may correspond to a cloudcomputing device (e.g., host machine), a distributed computing device(e.g., edge computing node), an end user device (e.g., smart phone,laptop), internet of things device (e.g., smart speaker), othercomputing device, or a combination thereof.

In the example shown in FIG. 4, computing environment 400 may includecomputing devices 110A-Z (e.g., different types of hosts), a data store120, and a network 150 that may be the same or similar to thecorresponding entities in FIG. 1. Computing device 110A may function asa task scheduler and may configure the proof-of-work key wrapping systemand the one or more computing devices 110B-Z may function as hosts toexecute tasks 105 (e.g., proof of work task or schedule job).

Computing device 110A may configure the proof-of-work key wrappingsystem by selecting cryptographic attributes and wrapping cryptographickeys in view of the cryptographic attributes. Computing device 110A mayconfigure the proof-of-work key wrapping system using key splitting, keythresholding, individual keys, integrated keys, other features, or acombination thereof as discussed below in regards to FIGS. 5, 6A, 6B,and 7. The wrapped cryptographic keys may be provided to a recipientcomputing device to enable the recipient computing device to accesscontent 102 (e.g., program data). Computing device 110A may include acryptographic attribute component 113, an encrypting component 115, anda data providing component 117, which may be the same or similar to thecomponents discussed in regards to FIGS. 1-2. Cryptographic attributecomponent 113 may select one or more sets of cryptographic attributes tocontrol the quantity of computing resources consumed by theproof-of-work key wrapping system. For example, selecting differentoptions for key lengths, salt values, or cryptographic functions affectthe quantity of computing resources a recipient computing deviceconsumes to derive the cryptographic key from the wrapped key. Asdiscussed above in regards to FIG. 2, the cryptographic attributes in asingle set may be selected to cause the recipient computing device toconsume a particular quantity of computing resources to derive a singlekey. Multiple sets of cryptographic attributes may be selected when therecipient computing devices is deriving multiple keys (e.g., multiplekeys for unwrapping the access key).

Deriving multiple keys using the multiple cryptographic attribute setsmay result in smoothing out statistical variations. This enables thecomputing resources that are actually consumed to derive a key to becloser to the approximated amount and further from the best case andworst case scenarios, as discussed below in regards to FIGS. 6A-6B. Theuse of multiple sets of cryptographic attributes may also enable theproof-of-work key wrapping system to verify different characteristics ofthe recipient computing device. The process of deriving each key mayfunction as a computational puzzle that is customized to verify aparticular characteristic of the recipient computing device. Thecharacteristics may relate to any of the computing resources and mayrelate to one or more hardware resources, program resources, otherresources, or a combination thereof. For example, cryptographicattribute component 113 may identify n sets of cryptographic attributes(e.g., 3 sets) that will each be used to enable the recipient computingdevice to derive a different key. A first set of cryptographicattributes may result in a computational puzzle that focuses on a firstcharacteristic (e.g., brute force attack that is processor intensive),the second set of cryptographic attributes may result in a computationalpuzzle that focuses on a second characteristic (e.g., brute force attackthat is memory intensive), and the third set may result in acomputational puzzle that focuses on a third characteristic (e.g., bruteforce attack that is I/O intensive).

If the recipient computing device is able to derive all three keys(e.g., solve all the computational puzzles) in a predetermined durationof time then it may indicate the recipient computing device satisfiesthe minimum threshold for each of the three characteristics beingverified. As such, the technology can be used to verify thecharacteristics of the recipient computing device satisfy one or moreperformance and/or capacity thresholds. The computational puzzles can beconfigured to focus on any one or more characteristics discussed abovein regards to characteristic data 242 of FIG. 2 or elsewhere in thisapplication. In one example, if the recipient computing device failssatisfying one of the groups of characteristics it may attempt tosatisfy another one of the groups to qualify.

The proof-of-work key wrapping system may be configured to useindependent keys, integrated keys, or a combination thereof to verifythe characteristics of the recipient computing device. The use ofindependent keys may enable the recipient computing device to performeach of the derivation processes in parallel which may make it harder toapproximate the computing resources consumed or the threshold time. Toenhance the predictability and consistency the proof-of-work keywrapping system may use integrated keys which will stop the one or morerecipient computing devices from performing the key derivation inparallel and cause the key derivation to be done serially (sequentially,not concurrently).

The proof-of-work key wrapping system may be configured to use keythresholding to verify the characteristics of the recipient computingdevice (e.g., satisfies at least 2 of the 3 characteristics). Forexample, the proof-of-work key wrapping system may be configured toinclude different computational puzzles that test differentcharacteristics of the recipient computing device but a recipientcomputing device may be sufficient if it solves a threshold number ofthe computational puzzles without solving all the computation puzzles.This may involve using proof-of-work key wrapping system of FIG. 5, 6A,or 6B and the key thresholding may be configured so that a subset of thekeys can be derived without deriving all keys (e.g., derive 2 of the 3keys within the threshold period of time). Extending the examplediscussed above, there may be multiple sets of cryptographic attributesets (e.g., three sets) that correspond respectively to multipledifferent characteristics that are being verified (e.g., threecharacteristics). When the recipient computing device satisfies any twoof those characteristics it can used the resulting two keys (e.g., keyshares) to decrypt the cryptographic key and use it to access the data.

The key thresholding for the proof-of-work key wrapping may be furtherextended to test alternative groups of characteristics and satisfactionof at least one of the groups enables the recipient computing device toqualify (e.g., device passes test). Each group of characteristics mayinclude one or more characteristics and a first group may include afirst characteristic (e.g., GPU speed above threshold) and a secondgroup may include a second and third characteristics (e.g., CPU speedabove threshold and memory capacity above threshold). The recipientcomputing device may satisfy either group within the predeterminedamount of time to qualify as being verified. In one example, if therecipient computing device may fail to satisfy one of the groups ofcharacteristics (e.g., GPU missing or insufficient) and it may satisfyanother one of the groups (e.g., CPU and memory are sufficient).

Content 102 may include program data that the recipient computing devicecan execute but the program data may remain un-executable until therecipient computing device derives the access key. Content 102 may bethe same or similar to content 102A-Z of FIG. 1 and may include programdata for one or more computer programs, virtual machine images,container images, other executable data structures, or a combinationthereof. The program data may include executable data (e.g., machinecode), non-executable data (e.g., configuration data, settings files),other data, or a combination thereof. The program data may be stored inan encrypted memory region and guarded by a trusted executionenvironment but may or may not be executed by the trusted executionenvironment (e.g., stored in TEE but executed outside of a TEE). Theinstance of the trusted execution environment that is guarding theprogram data may be the same or different from the TEE instanceexecuting the proof-of-work task. In either example, the program datamay originate from a remote data store and may be stored in data store120.

Data store 120 may function as a data repository (e.g., programrepository, image repository) and may include program data for one ormore programs. Data store 120 may be the same as the data store 120 ofFIG. 1 and may be local to the recipient computing device or remote fromthe recipient computing device. The program data may be stored in datastore 120 as one or more data storage objects (e.g., files, records). Inone example, the program data may stored in a package 402 with thewrapped key 114, cryptographic attribute 116, other data or acombination thereof.

The program data may include a condition checking function 403 that maybe executed after the recipient computing device has gained access tothe program data. Condition checking function 403 may be a portion ofprogram data that enables the recipient computing device to check that acondition is satisfied. The condition may be related to whether therecipient computing device was able to derive the key within apredetermined duration of time. Checking the condition may involvedetermining a duration of time associated with key derivation andcomparing the duration of time to an expected value (e.g., predeterminedthreshold time). Condition checking function 403 may determine the timeduration by checking time data that includes one or more current times,past times, future times, or a combination thereof. The time data may bederived from a device time (e.g. system time, processor time), storageobject time (e.g., file access time, creation time modification time,execution time), process or thread time (e.g., initiation time,aggregate execution time, termination time), other time data, or acombination thereof.

The time data may be analyzed to identify a time duration or analyzed toidentify multiple times that may be compared to determine the timeduration. For example, a first time may correspond to a time the keyderivation began (e.g., start time for proof-of-work key wrapping task)and may be based on a time before, during, or after the recipientcomputing device accesses the wrapped key 114, the cryptographicattribute 116, or a combination thereof. A second time may correspond tothe time the key derivation completed and may be based on a time before,during, or after the recipient computing device accesses, modifies, orexecutes program data. Condition checking function 403 may compare thefirst time and the second time to determine a time duration and mayadjust the times or duration to more accurately reflect the duration oftime consumed by the key derivation process. For example, the durationof time may be reduced to account for the amount of time it takes to usethe access key to access program data. Accessing program data may be thesame as accessing content (e.g., content accessing component 320 ofFIGS. 1-2) and may involve data decryption, connection establishment, ordevice authentication. The times may also or alternatively be adjustedin view of time associated with instantiating, deploying, initializing,configuring, other operation, or a combination thereof. Conditionchecking function 403 may then use the adjusted or unadjusted time todetermine whether the condition is satisfied. Based on the output ofcondition checking function 403, the program data may perform one ormore actions.

The actions performed by the program data may include one or moreoperations and may depend on whether the condition was satisfied. Theaction may involve terminating a program, providing a signal indicatingthe condition (e.g., fail message), disabling a feature, enabling afeature, other action, or a combination thereof. In one example, programdata may be a computer program and in response to the status of thecondition the computing program may terminate execution (e.g., exit) orcontinue execution (e.g., proceed). Terminating execution may involveterminating itself or another process executing on the recipientcomputing device or another device. In another example, programming datamay include instructions for providing a signal (e.g., message,indicator) from the recipient computing device to another device toindicate a status of the condition (e.g., satisfied or unsatisfied). Thesignal may be provided to a management device that configured theproof-of-work key wrapping or to another device that manages the programdata (e.g., provisioning server, deployment server, installation server,load balancer, etc.).

Computing devices 110X-Z provide example recipient computing devicesthat may execute programming data within trusted execution environments(not shown). Each of the computing device 110X-Z may correspond to atleast one physical processing device that is capable of executing one ormore computing operations. The term “computing device” may refer to aphysical machine, a virtual machine, a container, or a combinationthereof. Computing devices 110X-Z may provide one or more levels ofvirtualization for executing program data and the levels may includehardware level virtualization, operating system level virtualization,other virtualization, or a combination thereof. The hardware levelvirtualization may involve a hypervisor (e.g., virtual machine monitor)that emulates portions of a physical system and manages one or morevirtual machines. In contrast, operating system level virtualization mayinclude a single operating system kernel that manages multiple isolatedvirtual containers. Each virtual container may share the kernel of theunderlying operating system without requiring its own kernel.

Computing device 110X is an example of a computing device that provideshardware level virtualization. Computing device 110X may execute ahypervisor 432 that provides hardware resources to one or more virtualmachines 434. Hypervisor 432 may be any program or combination ofprograms and may run directly on the hardware (e.g., bare-metalhypervisor) or may run on or within a host operating system (not shown).The hypervisor may be the same as a virtual machine monitor and maymanage and monitor various aspects of the operations of the computingdevice, including the storage, memory, and network interfaces. Thehypervisor may abstract the physical layer hardware features such asprocessors, memory, and I/O devices, and present this abstraction asvirtual devices to a virtual machine 434 executing a guest operatingsystem 436.

Guest operating system 436 may be any program or combination of programsthat are capable of managing computing resources of virtual machine 434and/or computing device 110X. Guest operating system 436 may include akernel comprising one or more kernel space programs (e.g., memorydriver, network driver, file system driver) for interacting with virtualhardware devices or physical hardware devices. In one example, guestoperating system 436 may include Linux®, Solaris®, Microsoft Windows®,Apple Mac®, other operating system, or a combination thereof.

Computing device 110Y may be similar to computing device 110X and mayprovide operating system level virtualization by running a computerprogram that provides computing resources to one or more containers431A-B. Operating system level virtualization may be implemented withinthe kernel of operating system 433 and may enable the existence ofmultiple isolated containers. In one example, operating system levelvirtualization may not require hardware support and may impose little tono overhead because programs within each of the containers may use thesystem calls of the same underlying operating system 433. This mayenable computing device 110Y to provide virtualization without the needto provide hardware emulation or be run in a virtual machine (e.g.,intermediate layer) as may occur with hardware level virtualization.Operating system level virtualization may provide resource managementfeatures that isolate or limit the impact of one container (e.g.,container 431A) on the resources of another container (e.g., container431B).

The operating system level virtualization may provide a pool ofcomputing resources that are accessible by container 431A and areisolated from one or more other containers (e.g., container 431B). Thepool of resources may include file system resources (e.g., particularfile system state), network resources (e.g., particular networkinterfaces, sockets, addresses, or ports), memory resources (e.g.,particular memory portions), other computing resources, or a combinationthereof. The operating system level virtualization may also limit (e.g.,isolate) a container's access to one or more computing resources bymonitoring the container's activity and restricting the activity in viewof one or more limits. The limits may restrict the rate of the activity,the aggregate amount of the activity, or a combination thereof. Thelimits may include one or more of file system limits, disk limits,input/out (I/O) limits, memory limits, CPU limits, network limits, otherlimits, or a combination thereof.

Operating system 433 may include an operating system virtualizer thatmay provide containers 431A-B with access to computing resources. Theoperating system virtualizer may wrap one or more processes (e.g., of aparticular service) in a complete file system that contains the code,runtime, system tools, system libraries, and other data present on thenode (e.g., a particular file system state) that can be used by theprocesses executing within the container. In one example, the operatingsystem virtualizer may be the same or similar to Docker® for Linux® orWindows®, ThinApp® by VMWare®, Solaris Zones® by Oracle®, other program,or a combination thereof. In one example, the operating systemvirtualization may support and automate the packaging, deployment, andexecution of applications inside containers (e.g., Open Shift®).

Each of the containers 431A-B may refer to a resource-constrainedprocess space of computing device 110Y that can execute functionality ofthe program data. Containers 431A-B may be referred to as user-spaceinstances, virtualization engines (VE), or jails and may appear to auser as a standalone instance of the user space of operating system 433.Each of the containers 431A-B may share the same kernel but may beconstrained to use only a defined set of computing resources (e.g., CPU,memory, I/O). Aspects of the disclosure can create one or morecontainers to host a framework or provide other functionality of aservice (e.g., web application functionality, database functionality)and may therefore be referred to as “service containers” or “applicationcontainers.”

Pod 435 may be a data structure that is used to organize one or morecontainers 431A-B and enhance sharing between the containers, which mayreduce the level of isolation between containers within the same pod.Each pod may include one or more containers that share some computingresources with another container associated with the pod. Each pod maybe associated with a unique identifier, which may be a networkingaddress (e.g., IP address), that allows applications to use portswithout a risk of conflict. A pod may be associated with a pool ofresources and may define a volume, such as a local disk directory or anetwork disk and may expose the volume to one or more (e.g., all) of thecontainers within the pod. In one example, all of the containersassociated with a particular pod may be co-located on the same computingdevice 110Y. In another example, the containers associated with aparticular pod may be located on different computing devices that are onthe same or different physical machines.

Network 150 may be a public network (e.g., the internet), a privatenetwork (e.g., a local area network (LAN) or wide area network (WAN)),or a combination thereof. In one example, network 150 may include awired or a wireless infrastructure, which may be provided by one or morewireless communications systems, such as a wireless fidelity (WiFi)hotspot connected with the network 150 and/or a wireless carrier systemthat can be implemented using various data processing equipment,communication towers, etc.

FIG. 5 is a block diagram that illustrate an example proof-of-work keywrapping system 500 that uses a set of multiple keys to replace theaccess key, the wrap key, the wrapped access key, or other key. The useof multiple keys may smooth out statistical variations that arise whenattempting to approximate the amount of computing resources consumed bythe proof-of-work key wrapping scheme. Approximating the amount of timeor computing resources consumed to derive the cryptographic key may be astatistical operation that results in a statistical approximation. Thestatistical approximation may be an expected value that corresponds toan average consumption and the actual amount of computing resourcesconsumed for a particular instance consumed may vary between a best casescenario and worst case scenario. For example, deriving thecryptographic key from the wrapped key may involve an exhaustive keysearch to identify the unwrapping key (e.g., brute force attack). Thebest case scenario may occur when the first candidate key is theunwrapping key and the worst case scenario may occur when the lastcandidate key is the unwrapping key. To smooth out the statisticalvariations, the technology may use more keys. The increase in the numberof keys will increase the probability that the actual results will becloser to the expected average value and farther from the best and worstcase scenarios. This enables the technology to implement a proof-of-workkey wrapping mechanism that is more predictable and consistent in theamount of computing resources that are actually consumed in eachinstance.

Proof-of-work key wrapping system 500 may increase the number of keysbeing used by replacing one or more of the access key, the wrap key, thewrapping function, or the resulting wrapped key with corresponding sets.For example, the access key (e.g., cryptographic key 104) may bereplaced with a set of access keys (e.g., cryptographic keys 104A-C),the wrap key (e.g., cryptographic key 106) may be replaced with a set ofwrap keys (e.g., cryptographic keys 106A-C), and the resulting wrappedkey 114 may be replaced by a set of wrapped keys 114A-C. The wrapfunction (e.g., key encrypting module 224) may remain the same or may bereplaced by a set of wrap functions as shown (e.g., key encryptingmodules 224-C). Each wrap key in the set may be used to encrypt arespective access key to produce the set of wrapped keys (e.g., wrappedkeys 114A-C). The set of keys being wrapped (e.g., cryptographic keys104A-C) may be the same or similar to key fragments, key shares, keyparts, key portions, key segments, other term, or a combination thereof.The computing device performing the wrapping may use a different wrapkey to wrap each of the key shares. For example, cryptographic key106A-C (e.g., wrap keys) may be provided as input to one or more keyencrypting modules (e.g., 224 or 224A-C) to wrap cryptographic keys104A-C and produce wrapped keys 114A-C.

The use of multiple keys may affect the computing device configuring thekey wrapping (e.g., computing device 110A of FIG. 2) and the computingdevice breaching the wrapped key (e.g., computing device 110B of FIG.3). To account for the multiple keys, the technology may select andprovide multiple sets of cryptographic attributes as opposed to a singleset of cryptographic attributes. Each set of cryptographic attributesmay be selected by a device configuring the proof-of-work key wrappingand may be provided to a device performing the proof-of-work keywrapping task (e.g., guessing the key). Each set of cryptographicattributes may correspond to one or more unwrap keys and may be used tocreate the wrapping key to perform the wrapping or to derive the unwrapkey to perform unwrapping. The process of selecting and providing thedata for multiple keys may be the same discussed above in regards toselecting and providing data for a single key. Each of the keys in arespective set may be used individually to perform a cryptographic task(e.g., encrypt/decrypt, wrap/unwrap) or may be combined together toperform the task. The keys in a set may be independent from one anotheror may be integrated with one another as discussed below in regards toFIGS. 6A and 6B.

FIG. 6A and FIG. 6B are block diagrams that illustrate processesexecuted by a recipient computing device to derive a set of keys. Asdiscussed above, the set of keys may correspond to the access key, wrapkey, wrapped key, or a combination thereof. In one example, thetechnology may replace the access key (cryptographic key 104) with a setof multiple keys (e.g., key fragments) that are each individuallywrapped. The resulting wrapped keys (e.g., wrapped key fragments) may beprovided to a recipient computing device and the recipient computingdevice may derive a key to unwrap each of the wrapped keys. In anotherexample, the technology may replace the unwrapping key instead of or inaddition to replacing the access key being wrapped. In this example, asingle wrap key may be used to wrap and unwrap the access key and it maybe replaced by a set of multiple unwrap keys. The unwrap keys in the setmay be subsequently combined to unwrap the wrapped key (e.g., producethe original wrap/unwrap key). In either example, a key may be replacedby a set of keys by either using key splitting or key formation. The keysplitting may involve generating an original key and then splitting theoriginal key into fragments. The key fragments may then be combined toproduce the original key. Key formation may involve creating the keyfragments that can be subsequently combined without first creating thecombined key. As used throughout this application, the term key may be ageneral term that corresponds to any portion of key material (e.g., bitsequence) that is used as input to a cryptographic function. The termkey may correspond to an entire key, a fragment of a key (e.g., keyportion, key part, key piece, key element, key unit, key share, keyshard), a combined key (e.g., aggregate key, composite key, combinationkey, merged key), other bit sequence, or a combination thereof. A keyfragment may be an example of a key and is used in discussing FIGS. 6Aand 6B. Any use of the term key fragment or key share may be replacedwith key without changing the concepts discussed.

The set of unwrapping keys may include unwrapping keys that areintegrated with one another or may contain unwrapping keys that areindependent from one another. A set of unwrapping keys that areintegrated with one another may include an unwrapping key that ismathematically related to another key and is derived from anotherunwrapping key in the set. For example, at least one unwrapping key inthe set may be generated by providing one or more of the otherunwrapping keys in the set as input to a key derivation function. A setthat includes unwrapping keys that are independent from one another(e.g., non-integrated) may include unwrapping keys that are allindependent from one another and no key may be derived using another keyof the set as input. In either example, one or more of the wrapped keysmay be derived using the same cryptographic key function, differentcryptographic key functions, or a combination thereof.

FIG. 6A and FIG. 6B provide examples of a proof-of-work key wrappingsystem that uses multiple keys to unwrap one or more wrapped keys. FIG.6A includes example recipient computing device 600 that can derive a setof independent keys in parallel (e.g., concurrently, simultaneously).FIG. 6B includes an example recipient computing device 650 that canderive a set of integrated keys serially (e.g., sequentially). Theintegrated keys may be designed to stop the recipient computing devicefrom deriving all of the keys in parallel because the input of at leastone of the key deriving components includes the output key of a keyderiving component. In either example, the recipient computing devicemay use the resulting derived keys for unwrapping a wrapped key. FIGS.6A and 6B also illustrate how the resulting derived unwrapping keys maybe used individually for unwrapping portions of an access key or may becombined and the combined key may be used to unwrap the access key.

In the examples shown in FIGS. 6A and 6B, each recipient computingdevice 600 and 650 may derive cryptographic keys 106A-C in parallel orserially using the one or more key deriving components 310A-C and one ormore cryptographic attribute sets 116A-C. In the examples shown, asingle recipient computing device may derive each one of thecryptographic keys 106A-C. In other examples, multiple recipientcomputing devices may collectively derive cryptographic keys 106A-C andeach of the multiple recipient computing devices may derive one or moreof cryptographic keys 106A-C.

Cryptographic attribute sets 116A-C may each include one or morecryptographic attributes for deriving a cryptographic key. Thecryptographic attributes in sets 116A-C may be the same or similar tothe cryptographic attributes 116 of FIG. 1-3. Some of the cryptographicattributes in sets 116A-C may the same between sets and some of thecryptographic attributes in sets 116A-C may be different between sets.In one example, each of the cryptographic attribute sets 116A-C may bedifferent and used to derive a different cryptographic key. In anotherexample, two or more of the cryptographic attribute sets 116A-C may bethe same and combined with other data (e.g., output of cryptographic keyfunction and/or nonce) to derive different cryptographic keys using keyderiving component 310A-C.

Key deriving components 310A-C may be the same or similar to keyderiving component 310 of FIG. 3 and may include key generation featuresand the key verification features discussed above. In one example, eachof key deriving components 310A-C may use the same cryptographic keyfunction (e.g., key derivation function). In other examples, keyderiving components 310A-C may use different cryptographic keyfunctions. In either example, the cryptographic key function used by arespective key deriving component may be indicated by one of thecryptographic attributes, a proof-of-work protocol, a client programimplementing the proof-of-work protocol, other data, or a combinationthereof.

Key deriving components 310A-C of both FIG. 6A and FIG. 6B may takecryptographic attribute sets 116A-C as input and output cryptographickeys 106A-C. One or more of the key deriving components of FIG. 6B mayalso take as input integration data 616 from one or more key derivingcomponents. The integration data 616 may be from an earlier iteration ofthe key deriving component, from another instance of the same keyderiving component, output from a different key deriving component(e.g., on the same or different device), other variation, or acombination thereof. In the example shown in FIG. 6B, key derivingcomponent 310A may receive cryptographic attribute set 116A thatincludes a key length (e.g., 128 bit size), a salt value (e.g., 0x1010),a nonce (e.g., 11110000), other data, or a combination thereof. Keyderiving component 310A may then try multiple different candidate keysuntil it identifies cryptographic key 106A, which satisfied theverification function. Cryptographic key 106A may then be stored andcryptographic key 106A and cryptographic attribute set 116B may beprovided to key deriving component 310B as separate input (e.g.,different parameters or sources) or as combined input (e.g., sameparameter). Key deriving component 310B may then try multiple differentcandidate keys that are based on cryptographic key 106A (e.g.,mathematically related) until it identifies cryptographic key 106B,which satisfies the corresponding verification function. Cryptographickey 106B may then be stored and provided as input to key derivingcomponent 310C. In one example, key deriving component 310C may take asinput one or more of the previously derived cryptographic keys (e.g.,cryptographic key 106A or both cryptographic keys 106A and 106B). Thisprocess may be repeated for each subsequent key deriving component (notshown) to identify any subsequent cryptographic keys (not shown).

Each of the cryptographic keys 106A-C of FIGS. 6A and 6B may be the sameor similar to cryptographic key 106 of FIGS. 1-3 and may be used tounwrap one or more wrapped access keys. In FIG. 6A, each of the derivedcryptographic keys 106A-C may be used to unwrap a different wrapped key.For example, the access key may have been split and each fragment of theaccess key may have been individually wrapped and each of cryptographickeys 106A-C may be used to unwrap a respective individually wrappedfragment of the access key. In FIG. 6B, each of the derivedcryptographic keys 106A-C may be a fragment of an unwrapping key andcryptographic keys 106A-C may be combined to create cryptographic key106 that can be used to unwrap the wrapped access key.

The proof-of-work key wrapping system discussed above may be furtherenhanced to use key thresholding. Key thresholding may enable arecipient computing device to access content without deriving all of thekeys in a set. For example, the set of keys may include n keys (e.g., 7keys) and the recipient computing device may derive a subset of the keys(e.g., 3 keys) and the subset of keys may be used together to enable therecipient computing device to access content. The subset of keys may becombined into a combined key to access the content even though one ormore keys of the set are unknown to the recipient computing device. Thekeys in the subset may be provided to a cryptographic functionindividually as separate inputs or combined and provided as a singlecombined input. Any of the proof-of-work key wrapping systems discussedherein may implement key thresholding by replacing the access key, thewrap key, the resulting wrapped key, or a combination thereof with acorresponding set. The keys used for key thresholding may be referred toas key shares and may be the same or similar to key fragments, keyparts, key portions, key segments, other term, or a combination thereof.A subset of the keys (e.g., only first and last key share) may enablethe recipient computing device to access content and all or a subset ofthe keys in the set may be encrypted and provided to the recipientcomputing device. Therefore, as soon as the one or more recipientcomputing devices derive enough keys to satisfy the minimum number ofkeys (e.g., threshold) they may be used to access the content.

The computing device that configures the proof-of-work key wrapping maywrap each key using a different wrap key to produce different wrappedkeys (e.g., wrapped key shares). For example, cryptographic key 106A-C(e.g., wrap keys) may be provided as input to key encrypting module224A-C to wrap cryptographic keys 104A-C and produce wrapped keys114A-C. In other examples, proof-of-work key wrapping system may applykey thresholding to the access key (e.g., cryptographic key 104), to theunwrap key (e.g., cryptographic key 106), to other key material, or acombination thereof.

FIGS. 5, 6A, and 6B provide multiple different enhancements that can beused interchangeably in the examples discussed above and can be usedindividually or combination to increase the number of keys the recipientcomputing device needs to derive in order to access data. Theenhancements may include key splitting and/or key thresholding and maybe applied to the access key, unwrap key, other key, or a combinationthereof. In the examples discussed in regards to FIG. 1, there may be asingle access key (cryptographic key 104) that is encrypted and can bedecrypted using a single unwrap key (cryptographic key 106). Themultiple enhancements discussed above enable the proof-of-work keywrapping system to replace the access key, unwrap key, or both with aset of keys that work in combination with one another (e.g., keyfragments). For example, key thresholding may be used to replace theaccess key with a set of access keys (e.g., access key shares) that canbe individually wrapped and provided to one or more recipient computingdevices. The keys used to unwrap each wrapped key may be split toproduce multiple corresponding sets of unwrap key fragments. Each keyfragment may correspond to a set of cryptographic attributes (e.g.,hints) that may be provided to a recipient computing device with thewrapped key shares so that the recipient computing device and derive andcombine the key shares to access the content controlled using theproof-of-work key wrapping system.

By applying these enhancements a proof-of-work key wrapping system mayuse a large number of keys that may need to be derived. Extending theexample discussed above, the access key may be replaced by a set of Akeys (e.g., 8 access key fragments/shares) that are each individuallywrapped and correspond to a single unwrap key (e.g., fragments of anaggregate unwrap key). Each of the unwrap keys may be replaced by a setof B keys (e.g., 4 unwrap key shares). As a result, the recipientcomputing device may need to derive up to A×B keys (e.g., 32 keyfragments) to derive the original access key (cryptographic key 104). Ifkey thresholding is applied to both sets then the number may be reduced.For example, there may be a threshold for the access key set (T_(a))(e.g., 50% of the set) and a threshold for the unwrap key set (T_(b))(e.g., 75% of set). This will result in the recipient computing deviceneeding to derive a minimum of [A×T_(a)]×[B×T_(b)] keys (e.g., minimumof 12 of the 32 key shares). These keys may be integrated or independentand may be collectively derived by one or more recipient computingdevices in parallel or serially according to the above examples.

As discussed above, the technology disclosed herein may increase thenumber of keys in multiple ways. In one example, the technology maysplit the cryptographic key into multiple keys (e.g., key fragments)that are each individually wrapped. The resulting wrapped keys (e.g.,wrapped key fragments) may be provided to a recipient computing devicewith cryptographic attributes (e.g., hints for breaching each wrappedkey) and the recipient computing device may derive the unwrapping keyfor each of the wrapped keys. In another example, the technology maysplit the unwrapping key instead of or in addition to splitting thecryptographic key being wrapped. The unwrapping key may be replaced witha set of unwrapping keys. In this situation, a single wrapped key may beprovided to the recipient computing device along with cryptographicattributes for each unwrapping key in the set (e.g., hints for eachunwrap key fragment). The cryptographic attributes may enable therecipient computing device to derive each of the multiple unwrappingkeys and the multiple unwrapping keys may be combined and used to unwrapthe wrapped key.

The cryptographic key or unwrapping key discussed throughout thisapplication may be a set of keys and multiple keys of the set may becombined to enable access to the restricted content. The keys in the setmay be the same or similar to key fragments, key shares, key segments,key parts, other term, or a combination thereof. Two or more of the keysin the set may be combined and provided as a single input or as separateinputs to a cryptographic function. In one example, all of the keys in aset may be used together and if one or more of the keys in the set areunknown to the recipient computing device the recipient computing devicemay be unable to access the content. In another example, a subset of thekeys in the set may be used together even though one or more keys in theset are unknown. In the latter example, the minimum quantity of keys inthe subset may need to satisfy a threshold number before access isenabled (e.g., key thresholding). For example, a set may include sevenkeys (n=7) and the threshold may be configured to be the integer valuethree (t=3) and if the subset has at least three of the seven keys, thecontent may be accessible (e.g., t of n).

FIGS. 7 and 9 depict flow diagrams of illustrative methods for verifyingcomputing resources using a proof-of-work key wrapping system, inaccordance with one or more aspects of the present disclosure. Themethods and each of their individual functions, routines, subroutines,or operations may be performed by one or more processors of a computerdevice executing the method. In certain implementations, an examplemethod may be performed by a single computing device. Alternatively, anexample method may be performed by two or more computing devices andeach of the computing devices may execute one or more individualfunctions, routines, subroutines, or operations of the method.

For simplicity of explanation, the example methods of this disclosureare depicted and described as a series of acts. However, acts inaccordance with this disclosure can occur in various orders and/orconcurrently, and with other acts not presented and described herein.Furthermore, not all illustrated acts may be required to implement themethods in accordance with the disclosed subject matter. In addition,those skilled in the art will understand and appreciate that the methodscould alternatively be represented as a series of interrelated statesvia a state diagram or events. Additionally, it should be appreciatedthat the methods disclosed in this specification are capable of beingstored on an article of manufacture to facilitate transporting andtransferring such methods to computing devices. The term “article ofmanufacture,” as used herein, is intended to encompass a computerprogram accessible from any computer-readable device or storage media.The example methods may be performed by computing devices 110A-Z of FIG.1, other computing device, or a combination thereof.

Referring to FIG. 7, example method 700 may be depicted as a flowdiagram and involve using a proof-of-work key wrapping system to verifydevice capabilities, in accordance with one or more aspects of thepresent disclosure. Method 700 may be executed by one or more processingdevices of a client device or server device and may begin with block702. At block 702, a processing device may access a wrapped key and acryptographic attribute for the wrapped key from an encrypted memoryregion. The wrapped key encodes a cryptographic key and thecryptographic attribute may include a cryptographic attribute of acryptographic key used to generate the wrapped key. In one example, thecryptographic attribute may include one or more of a key length, a keyderivation function, or a salt value. In one example, the processingdevice may provide a trusted execution environment (TEE) that comprisesthe encrypted memory region and the processing device may use thetrusted execution environment to execute the instructions and to storethe derived cryptographic key. The encrypted memory region may includean enclave that stores data that is encrypted and decrypted usingcryptographic keys that are accessible to the processing device and areinaccessible to all processes executed by the processing device.

At block 704, the processing device may derive the cryptographic key inview of the wrapped key and the cryptographic attribute. The derivingmay consume computing resources for a particular duration of time.Deriving the cryptographic key may involve deriving the cryptographickey from the wrapped key without being provided a key to unwrap thewrapped key. In one example, deriving the cryptographic key may involvegenerating and verifying a plurality of candidate cryptographic keys forunwrapping the wrapped key in view of the cryptographic attribute.

At block 706, the processing device may use the cryptographic key toaccess program data. The program data may include executable data of atleast one of a computer program, a virtual machine image, or a containerimage. In one example, the program data may be accessible over aconnection and using the cryptographic key to access the program datamay involve establishing the connection using the cryptographic key. Inanother example, the program data may be encrypted and using thecryptographic key to access the program data may involve decrypting theprogram data in view of the cryptographic key. The encrypted version ofthe program data and the wrapped key may or may not be packagedtogether.

At block 708, the processing device may execute the program data. Theexecuted program data may evaluate one or more conditions related to theduration of time of the derivation. The duration of time for derivingthe cryptographic key may or may not satisfy a predetermined minimumthreshold value which may correspond directly to a speed of thecomputing resources.

At block 710, the processing device may transmit a message comprising anindication of the condition. Transmitting the message may involvetransmitting a message to a device that generated the wrapped key andthe message may indicate that the deriving of the cryptographic key inview of the wrapped key occurred within a predetermined minimumthreshold time. Responsive to completing the operations described hereinabove with references to block 710, the method may terminate.

FIG. 8 depicts a block diagram of a computer system 800 operating inaccordance with one or more aspects of the present disclosure. Computersystem 800 may be the same or similar to computing device 110A of FIG. 2or computing device 110B of FIG. 3, and may include one or moreprocessing devices and one or more memory devices. In the example shown,computer system 800 may include an attribute accessing module 810, a keyderiving module 820, an access module 830, a program execution module840, and a message transmitting module 850.

Attribute accessing module 810 may enable a processing device to accessa wrapped key and a cryptographic attribute for the wrapped key from anencrypted memory region. The wrapped key encodes a cryptographic key andthe cryptographic attribute may include a cryptographic attribute of acryptographic key used to generate the wrapped key. In one example, thecryptographic attribute may include one or more of a key length, a keyderivation function, or a salt value. In one example, the processingdevice may provide a trusted execution environment (TEE) that comprisesthe encrypted memory region and the processing device may use thetrusted execution environment to execute the instructions and to storethe derived cryptographic key. The encrypted memory region may includean enclave that stores data that is encrypted and decrypted usingcryptographic keys that are accessible to the processing device and areinaccessible to all processes executed by the processing device.

Key deriving module 820 may enable the processing device to derive thecryptographic key in view of the wrapped key and the cryptographicattribute. The deriving may consume computing resources for a particularduration of time. Deriving the cryptographic key may involve derivingthe cryptographic key from the wrapped key without being provided a keyto unwrap the wrapped key. In one example, deriving the cryptographickey may involve generating and verifying a plurality of candidatecryptographic keys for unwrapping the wrapped key in view of thecryptographic attribute.

Access module 830 may enable the processing device to use thecryptographic key to access program data. The program data may includeexecutable data of at least one of a computer program, a virtual machineimage, or a container image. In one example, the program data may beaccessible over a connection and using the cryptographic key to accessthe program data may involve establishing the connection using thecryptographic key. In another example, the program data may be encryptedand using the cryptographic key to access the program data may involvedecrypting the program data in view of the cryptographic key. Theencrypted version of the program data and the wrapped key may or may notbe packaged together.

Program execution module 840 may enable the processing device to executethe program data. The executed program data may evaluate one or moreconditions related to the duration of time of the derivation. Theduration of time for deriving the cryptographic key may or may notsatisfy a predetermined minimum threshold value which may corresponddirectly to a speed of the computing resources.

Message transmitting module 850 may enable the processing device totransmit a message comprising an indication of the condition.Transmitting the message may involve transmitting a message to a devicethat generated the wrapped key and the message may indicate that thederiving of the cryptographic key in view of the wrapped key occurredwithin a predetermined minimum threshold time.

Referring to FIG. 9, example method 900 may be depicted as a flowdiagram and involve using a proof-of-work key wrapping system to verifydevice capabilities, in accordance with one or more aspects of thepresent disclosure. Method 900 may be executed by one or more processingdevices of a client device or server device and may begin with block902.

At block 902, a processing device may receive, for a computing device, awrapped key and a cryptographic attribute for the wrapped key. Thewrapped key encodes a cryptographic key and the cryptographic attributemay include a cryptographic attribute of a cryptographic key used togenerate the wrapped key. In one example, the cryptographic attributemay include one or more of a key length, a key derivation function, or asalt value.

At block 904, the processing device may store instructions, the wrappedkey and the cryptographic attribute in an encrypted memory region. Inone example, the processing device may provide a trusted executionenvironment (TEE) that comprises the encrypted memory region and theprocessing device may use the trusted execution environment to executethe instructions and to store the derived cryptographic key. Theencrypted memory region may include an enclave that stores data that isencrypted and decrypted using cryptographic keys that are accessible tothe processing device and are inaccessible to all processes executed bythe processing device.

At block 906, the processing device may derive the cryptographic key inview of the wrapped key and the cryptographic attribute. The derivingmay consume computing resources for a particular duration of time.Deriving the cryptographic key may involve deriving the cryptographickey from the wrapped key without being provided a key to unwrap thewrapped key. In one example, deriving the cryptographic key may involvegenerating and verifying a plurality of candidate cryptographic keys forunwrapping the wrapped key in view of the cryptographic attribute.

At block 908, the processing device may use the cryptographic key toaccess program data. The program data may include executable data of atleast one of a computer program, a virtual machine image, or a containerimage. In one example, the program data may be accessible over aconnection and using the cryptographic key to access the program datamay involve establishing the connection using the cryptographic key. Inanother example, the program data may be encrypted and using thecryptographic key to access the program data may involve decrypting theprogram data in view of the cryptographic key. The encrypted version ofthe program data and the wrapped key may or may not be packagedtogether.

At block 910, the processing device may execute the program data. Theexecuted program data may evaluate one or more conditions related to theduration of time of the derivation. The duration of time for derivingthe cryptographic key may or may not satisfy a predetermined minimumthreshold value which may correspond directly to a speed of thecomputing resources.

At block 912, the processing device may transmit a message comprising anindication of the condition. Transmitting the message may involvetransmitting a message to a device that generated the wrapped key andthe message may indicate that the deriving of the cryptographic key inview of the wrapped key occurred within a predetermined minimumthreshold time. Responsive to completing the operations described hereinabove with references to block 912, the method may terminate.

FIG. 10 depicts a block diagram of a computer system operating inaccordance with one or more aspects of the present disclosure. Invarious illustrative examples, computer system 1000 may correspond tocomputing device 110A-Z of FIG. 1, computing device 110A of FIG. 2, orcomputing device 110B of FIG. 3. Computer system 1000 may be includedwithin a data center that supports virtualization. Virtualization withina data center results in a physical system being virtualized usingvirtual machines to consolidate the data center infrastructure andincrease operational efficiencies. A virtual machine (VM) may be aprogram-based emulation of computer hardware. For example, the VM mayoperate based on computer architecture and functions of computerhardware resources associated with hard disks or other such memory. TheVM may emulate a physical environment, but requests for a hard disk ormemory may be managed by a virtualization layer of a computing device totranslate these requests to the underlying physical computing hardwareresources. This type of virtualization results in multiple VMs sharingphysical resources.

In certain implementations, computer system 1000 may be connected (e.g.,via a network, such as a Local Area Network (LAN), an intranet, anextranet, or the Internet) to other computer systems. Computer system1000 may operate in the capacity of a server or a client computer in aclient-server environment, or as a peer computer in a peer-to-peer ordistributed network environment. Computer system 1000 may be provided bya personal computer (PC), a tablet PC, a set-top box (STB), a PersonalDigital Assistant (PDA), a cellular telephone, a web appliance, aserver, a network router, switch or bridge, or any device capable ofexecuting a set of instructions (sequential or otherwise) that specifyactions to be taken by that device. Further, the term “computer” shallinclude any collection of computers that individually or jointly executea set (or multiple sets) of instructions to perform any one or more ofthe methods described herein.

In a further aspect, the computer system 1000 may include a processingdevice 1002, a volatile memory 1004 (e.g., random access memory (RAM)),a non-volatile memory 1006 (e.g., read-only memory (ROM) orelectrically-erasable programmable ROM (EEPROM)), and a data storagedevice 1016, which may communicate with each other via a bus 1008.

Processing device 1002 may be provided by one or more processors such asa general purpose processor (such as, for example, a complex instructionset computing (CISC) microprocessor, a reduced instruction set computing(RISC) microprocessor, a very long instruction word (VLIW)microprocessor, a microprocessor implementing other types of instructionsets, or a microprocessor implementing a combination of types ofinstruction sets) or a specialized processor (such as, for example, anapplication specific integrated circuit (ASIC), a field programmablegate array (FPGA), a digital signal processor (DSP), or a networkprocessor).

Computer system 1000 may further include a network interface device1022. Computer system 1000 also may include a video display unit 1010(e.g., an LCD), an alphanumeric input device 1012 (e.g., a keyboard), acursor control device 1014 (e.g., a mouse), and a signal generationdevice 1020.

Data storage device 1016 may include a non-transitory computer-readablestorage medium 1024 on which may store instructions 1026 encoding anyone or more of the methods or functions described herein, includinginstructions for implementing method 700 or 900 and for encodingcomponents 312, 314, 316, and 318 of FIG. 3.

Instructions 1026 may also reside, completely or partially, withinvolatile memory 1004 and/or within processing device 1002 duringexecution thereof by computer system 1000, hence, volatile memory 1004and processing device 1002 may also constitute machine-readable storagemedia.

While computer-readable storage medium 1024 is shown in the illustrativeexamples as a single medium, the term “computer-readable storage medium”shall include a single medium or multiple media (e.g., a centralized ordistributed database, and/or associated caches and servers) that storethe one or more sets of executable instructions. The term“computer-readable storage medium” shall also include any tangiblemedium that is capable of storing or encoding a set of instructions forexecution by a computer that cause the computer to perform any one ormore of the methods described herein. The term “computer-readablestorage medium” shall include, but not be limited to, solid-statememories, optical media, and magnetic media.

Other computer system designs and configurations may also be suitable toimplement the system and methods described herein. The followingexamples illustrate various implementations in accordance with one ormore aspects of the present disclosure.

The methods, components, and features described herein may beimplemented by discrete hardware components or may be integrated in thefunctionality of other hardware components such as ASICS, FPGAs, DSPs orsimilar devices. In addition, the methods, components, and features maybe implemented by firmware modules or functional circuitry withinhardware devices. Further, the methods, components, and features may beimplemented in any combination of hardware devices and computer programcomponents, or in computer programs.

Unless specifically stated otherwise, terms such as “determining,”“deriving,” “encrypting,” “creating,” “generating,” “using,”“accessing,” “executing,” “obtaining,” “storing,” “transmitting,”“providing,” “establishing,” “receiving,” “identifying,” “initiating,”or the like, refer to actions and processes performed or implemented bycomputer systems that manipulates and transforms data represented asphysical (electronic) quantities within the computer system registersand memories into other data similarly represented as physicalquantities within the computer system memories or registers or othersuch information storage, transmission or display devices. Also, theterms “first,” “second,” “third,” “fourth,” etc. as used herein aremeant as labels to distinguish among different elements and may not havean ordinal meaning according to their numerical designation.

Examples described herein also relate to an apparatus for performing themethods described herein. This apparatus may be specially constructedfor performing the methods described herein, or it may comprise ageneral purpose computer system selectively programmed by a computerprogram stored in the computer system. Such a computer program may bestored in a computer-readable tangible storage medium.

The methods and illustrative examples described herein are notinherently related to any particular computer or other apparatus.Various general purpose systems may be used in accordance with theteachings described herein, or it may prove convenient to construct morespecialized apparatus to perform method 300 and/or each of itsindividual functions, routines, subroutines, or operations. Examples ofthe structure for a variety of these systems are set forth in thedescription above.

The above description is intended to be illustrative, and notrestrictive. Although the present disclosure has been described withreferences to specific illustrative examples and implementations, itwill be recognized that the present disclosure is not limited to theexamples and implementations described. The scope of the disclosureshould be determined with reference to the following claims, along withthe full scope of equivalents to which the claims are entitled.

What is claimed is:
 1. A method comprising: accessing instructions, awrapped key, and a cryptographic attribute for the wrapped key from anencrypted memory region, wherein the wrapped key encodes a cryptographickey; executing, by a processing device, the instructions to derive thecryptographic key in view of the wrapped key and the cryptographicattribute, wherein the executing to derive the cryptographic keycomprises a proof-of-work task that consumes computing resources for aduration of time; using the cryptographic key to access program data;executing, by the processing device, the program data, wherein theexecuted program data evaluates a condition related to the duration oftime; and transmitting a message comprising an indication of theevaluated condition.
 2. The method of claim 1, wherein transmitting themessage comprises transmitting a message over a network to a schedulingdevice that generated the wrapped key, wherein the message indicatesthat the deriving of the cryptographic key in view of the wrapped keyoccurred within a predetermined minimum threshold time.
 3. The method ofclaim 1, wherein the processing device provides a trusted executionenvironment (TEE) that comprises the encrypted memory region, andwherein the processing device uses the trusted execution environment toexecute the instructions and to store the derived cryptographic key. 4.The method of claim 1, wherein the encrypted memory region comprises anenclave that stores data that is encrypted and decrypted usingcryptographic keys that are accessible to the processing device and areinaccessible to any processes executed by the processing device.
 5. Themethod of claim 1, wherein the encrypted memory region comprises datathat is accessible to a virtual machine in a decrypted form and isinaccessible to a hypervisor in the decrypted form.
 6. The method ofclaim 1, wherein the cryptographic attribute comprises a cryptographicattribute of a cryptographic key used to generate the wrapped key,wherein the cryptographic attribute comprises one or more of a keylength, a key derivation function, or a salt value.
 7. The method ofclaim 1, wherein deriving the cryptographic key comprises generating aplurality of candidate cryptographic keys for unwrapping the wrapped keyin view of the cryptographic attribute.
 8. The method of claim 1,wherein the program data comprises executable data of at least one of acomputer program, a virtual machine image, or a container image.
 9. Themethod of claim 1, wherein the wrapped key and an encrypted version ofthe program data are packaged together.
 10. The method of claim 1,wherein the duration of time for deriving the cryptographic keysatisfies a predetermined minimum threshold value and corresponds to aspeed of the computing resources.
 11. The method of claim 1, wherein theprogram data is encrypted and wherein using the cryptographic key toaccess the program data comprises decrypting the program data in view ofthe cryptographic key.
 12. A system comprising: a memory; and aprocessing device communicably coupled to the memory, the processingdevice to: access instructions, a wrapped key, and a cryptographicattribute for the wrapped key from an encrypted memory region, whereinthe wrapped key encodes a cryptographic key; execute the instructions toderive the cryptographic key in view of the wrapped key and thecryptographic attribute, wherein the executing to derive thecryptographic key comprises a proof-of-work task that consumes computingresources for a duration of time; use the cryptographic key to accessprogram data; execute the program data, wherein the executed programdata evaluates a condition related to the duration of time; and transmita message comprising an indication of the evaluated condition.
 13. Thesystem of claim 12, wherein the processing device transmits the messageover a network to a scheduling device that generated the wrapped key,and wherein the message indicates that the deriving of the cryptographickey in view of the wrapped key occurred within a predetermined minimumthreshold time.
 14. The system of claim 12, wherein the processingdevice provides a trusted execution environment (TEE) that comprises theencrypted memory region, and wherein the processing device uses thetrusted execution environment to execute the instructions and to storethe derived cryptographic key.
 15. A non-transitory machine-readablestorage medium storing instructions which, when executed, cause aprocessing device to perform operations comprising: receiving, from acomputing device over a network, a wrapped key and a cryptographicattribute for the wrapped key, wherein the wrapped key encodes acryptographic key; storing the wrapped key, the cryptographic attributeand instructions into an encrypted memory region; executing, by aprocessing device, instructions to derive the cryptographic key in viewof the wrapped key and the cryptographic attribute, wherein theexecuting the instructions to derive the cryptographic key comprises aproof-of-work task that consumes computing resources for a duration oftime; using the cryptographic key to access program data; executing, bythe processing device, the program data, wherein the executed programdata evaluates a condition related to the duration of time; andtransmitting a message comprising an indication of the evaluatedcondition.
 16. The non-transitory machine-readable storage medium ofclaim 15, wherein transmitting the message comprises transmitting amessage over a network to a scheduling device that generated the wrappedkey, wherein the message indicates that the deriving of thecryptographic key in view of the wrapped key occurred within apredetermined minimum threshold time.
 17. The non-transitorymachine-readable storage medium of claim 15, wherein the processingdevice provides a trusted execution environment (TEE) that comprises theencrypted memory region, and wherein the processing device uses thetrusted execution environment to execute the instructions and to storethe derived cryptographic key.
 18. The non-transitory machine-readablestorage medium of claim 15, wherein the encrypted memory regioncomprises an enclave that stores data that is encrypted and decryptedusing cryptographic keys that are accessible to the processing deviceand are inaccessible to any processes executed by the processing device.19. The non-transitory machine-readable storage medium of claim 15,wherein the encrypted memory region comprises data that is accessible toa virtual machine in a decrypted form and is inaccessible to ahypervisor in the decrypted form.
 20. The non-transitorymachine-readable storage medium of claim 15, wherein the cryptographicattribute comprises a cryptographic attribute of a cryptographic keyused to generate the wrapped key, wherein the cryptographic attributecomprises one or more of a key length, a key derivation function, or asalt value.